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#### Property law is a settler colonial technology. Recasting land as property generates patterns of social relations that necessitate indigenous dispossession, exploitation of nonhuman animals, and ecological destruction. The plan dismantles property rights through a program of decolonial rematriation.

**Paperson 17** La, also K. Wayne Yang, an associate professor of ethnic studies at the University of California, San Diego. “A Third University Is Possible” June 2017.

Land is the prime concern of settler colonialism, contexts in which the colonizer comes to a “new” place not only to seize and exploit but to stay, making that “new” place his permanent home. Settler colonialism thus complicates the center–periphery model that was classically used to describe colonialism, wherein an imperial center, the “metropole,” dominates distant colonies, the “periphery.” Typically, one thinks of European colonization of Africa, India, the Caribbean, the Pacific Islands, in terms of external colonialism, also called exploitation colonialism, where land and human beings are recast as natural resources for primitive accumulation: coltan, petroleum, diamonds, water, salt, seeds, genetic material, chattel. Theories named as “settler colonial studies” had a resurgence beginning around 2006.[2] However, the analysis of settler colonialism is actually not new, only often ignored within Western critiques of empire.[3] The critical literatures of the colonized have long positioned the violence of settlement as a prime feature in colonial life as well as in global arrangements of power. We can see this in Franz Fanon’s foundational critiques of colonialism. Whereas Fanon’s work is often generalized for its diagnoses of anti/colonial violence and the racialized psychoses of colonization upon colonized and colonizer, Fanon is also talking about settlement as the particular feature of French colonization in Algeria. For Fanon, the violence of French colonization in Algeria arises from settlement as a spatial immediacy of empire: the geospatial collapse of metropole and colony into the same time and place. On the “selfsame land” are spatialized white immunity and racialized violation, non-Native desires for freedom, Black life, and Indigenous relations.[4] Settler colonialism is too often thought of as “what happened” to Indigenous people. This kind of thinking confines the experiences of Indigenous people, their critiques of settler colonialism, their decolonial imaginations, to an unwarranted historicizing parochialism, as if settler colonialism were a past event that “happened to” Native peoples and not generalizable to non-Natives. Actually, settler colonialism is something that “happened for” settlers. Indeed, it is happening for them/us right now. Wa Thiong’o’s question of how instead of why directs us to think of land tenancy laws, debt, and the privatization of land as settler colonial technologies that enable the “eventful” history of plunder and disappearance. Property law is a settler colonial technology. The weapons that enforce it, the knowledge institutions that legitimize it, the financial institutions that operationalize it, are also technologies. Like all technologies, they evolve and spread. Recasting land as property means severing Indigenous peoples from land. This separation, what Hortense Spillers describes as “the loss of Indigenous name/land” for Africans-turned-chattel, recasts Black Indigenous people as black bodies for biopolitical disposal: who will be moved where, who will be murdered how, who will be machinery for what, and who will be made property for whom.[5] In the alienation of land from life, alienable rights are produced: the right to own (property), the right to law (protection through legitimated violence), the right to govern (supremacist sovereignty), the right to have rights (humanity). In a word, what is produced is whiteness. Moreover, it is not just human beings who are refigured in the schism. Land and nonhumans become alienable properties, a move that first alienates land from its own sovereign life. Thus we can speak of the various technologies required to create and maintain these separations, these alienations: Black from Indigenous, human from nonhuman, land from life.[6] “How?” is a question you ask if you are concerned with the mechanisms, not just the motives, of colonization. Instead of settler colonialism as an ideology, or as a history, you might consider settler colonialism as a set of technologies —a frame that could help you to forecast colonial next operations and to plot decolonial directions. This chapter proceeds with the following insights. (1) The settler–native– slave triad does not describe identities. The triad—an analytic mainstay of settler colonial studies—digs a pitfall of identity that not only chills collaborations but also implies that the racial will be the solution. (2) Technologies are trafficked. Technologies generate patterns of social relations to land. Technologies mutate, and so do these relationships. Colonial technologies travel. In tracing technologies’ past and future trajectories, we can connect how settler colonial and antiblack technologies circulate in transnational arenas. (3) Land—not just people—is the biopolitical target.[7] The examples are many: fracking, biopiracy, damming of rivers and flooding of valleys, the carcasses of pigs that die from the feed additive ractopamine and are allowable for harvest by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. The subjugation of land and nonhuman life to deathlike states in order to support “human” life is a “biopolitics” well beyond the Foucauldian conception of biopolitical as governmentality or the neoliberal disciplining of modern, bourgeois, “human” subject. (4) (Y)our task is to theorize in the break, that is, to refuse the master narrative that technology is loyal to the master, that (y)our theory has a Eurocentric origin. Black studies, Indigenous studies, and Othered studies have already made their breaks with Foucault (over biopolitics), with Deleuze and Guatarri (over assemblages and machines), and with Marx (over life and primitive accumulation). (5) Even when they are dangerous, understanding technologies provides us some pathways for decolonizing work. We can identify projects of collaboration on decolonial technologies. Colonizing mechanisms are evolving into new forms, and they might be subverted toward decolonizing operations.The Settler–Native–Slave Triad Does Not Describe Identities One of the main interventions of settler colonial studies has been to insist that the patterning of social relations is shaped by colonialism’s thirst for land and thus is shaped to fit modes of empire. Because colonialism is a perverted affair, our relationships are also warped into complicitous arrangements of violation, trespass, and collusion with its mechanisms. For Fanon, the psychosis of colonialism arises from the patterning of violence into the binary relationship between the immune humanity of the white settler and the impugned humanity of the native. For Fanon, the supremacist “right” to create settler space that is immune from violence, and the “right” to abuse the body of the Native to maintain white immunity, this is the spatial and fleshy immediacy of settler colonialism. Furthermore, the “humanity” of the settler is constructed upon his agency over the land and nature. As Maldonado- Torres explains, “I think, therefore I am” is actually an articulation of “I conquer, therefore I am,” a sense of identity posited upon the harnessing of nature and its “natural” people.[8] This creates a host of post+colonial problems that have come to define modernity. Because the humanity of the settler is predicated on his ability to “write the world,” to make history upon and over the natural world, the colonized is instructed to make her claim to humanity by similarly acting on the world or, more precisely, acting in his. Indeed, for Fanon, it is the perverse ontology of settler becomings—becoming landowner or becoming property, becoming killable or becoming a killer—and the mutual implication of tortured and torturer that mark the psychosis of colonialism. This problem of modernity and colonial psychosis is echoed in Jack Forbes’s writings: Columbus was a wétiko. He was mentally ill or insane, the carrier of a terribly contagious psychological disease, the wétiko psychosis. . . . The wétiko psychosis, and the problems it creates, have inspired many resistance movements and efforts at reform or revolution. Unfortunately, most of these efforts have failed because they have never diagnosed the wétiko.[9] Under Western modernity, becoming “free” means becoming a colonizer, and because of this, “the central contradiction of modernity is freedom.”[10] Critiques of settler colonialism, therefore, do not offer just another “type” of colonialism to add to the literature but a mode of analysis that has repercussions for any diagnosis of coloniality and for understanding the modern conditions of freedom. By modern conditions of freedom, I mean that Western freedom is a product of colonial modernity, and I mean that such freedom comes with conditions, with strings attached, most manifest as terms of unfreedom for nonhumans. As Cindi Mayweather says, “your freedom’s in a bind.”[11]

#### Overaccumulation guarantees extinction from a confluence of converging planetary crises. Decolonization enables the emergence of alternative lifeways that rejuvenate the world-system.

Helland and Lindgren 16 Leonardo E. Figueroa Helland, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Westminster College, M.A. Arizona State University, Ph.D. Arizona State University Westminster College, Tim Lindgren, Research Assistant at Westminster College, *What Goes Around Comes Around: From The Coloniality of Power to the Crisis of Civilization*, Journal of World-Systems Research, 2016, Vol 22 Issue 2, p. 431-438

Today we face a planetary crisis. Environmental, energy, food, financial, and social reproduction crises are disrupting the world-system (Ahmed 2010; McMichael 2011; Chase-Dunn 2013; Houtart 2010; Kallis, Martinez-Alier and Norgaard 2009; Foster, Clark, York 2010; Goodman and Salleh 2015; Peterson 2010; Rockstrom et.al. 2009, 2009b; Salleh 2012; Smith 2014; Steffen et.al. 2007). This planetary crisis, we argue, has been triggered by a globalizing mode of civilization that has become hegemonic.2 This mode of civilization is constituted and underpinned by anthropocentric, androcentric, hetero-patriarchal, Euro/Western-centric, modern/colonial and capitalist systems of power. Building on world-systems, decolonial, eco-feminist and posthuman theories, we contend that the “coloniality of power” (Quijano 1991; Grosfoguel 2009; Mignolo 2008; Lugones 2007; Maese-Cohen 2010; Dastile and Ndlovu-Gastheni 2013) has worked to globalize a civilization that exhausts the planet and exploits most of its people, thus unleashing a socioecological blowback that is turning this civilization into its own worst enemy. By “coloniality” we refer to the complex and multidimensional legacy of divisive, exploitative, stratifying and hierarchical forms of power (e.g., Eurocentric/Western-centric hegemony), forms of knowledge (e.g., technoscientific instrumental rationality), forms of (inter)subjectivity (e.g., possessive individualism), forms of human interrelations (e.g., racism, classism, heteropatriarchalism, etc.), and forms of human dominion over land and mastery of “nature” (e.g., anthropocentric property/dominion/sovereignty) that have become entrenched and continue to be reproduced throughout the world as an ongoing consequence of colonization. Coloniality thus entails that the hegemony of colonial forms persists to this day as a legacy that structurally constitutes modernity, even into supposedly “postcolonial” times. Coloniality is the underside of modernity: the historical and structural foundation that has enabled—e.g., through conquest, imperialism, slavery, resource extraction and Western dominance—the rise, hegemony, and globalization of a world-system dominated by modern civilization. This civilization has sought to globalize a political-economic model bent on endless accumulation, consumption and growth on a finite planet (Ahmed 2010; Foster, Clark, York 2010; Goodman and Salleh 2013; McMichael 2011; Steffen et.al. 2007; WPCCC 2010). Now in its “neoliberal” stage, this model reinforces a historically-ongoing coloniality of power premised on linear discourses of “progress,” “modernization,” “development,” and “evolution,” altogether constituting a hegemonic “standard of civilization.” Globalized through (neo)colonialism and (neo)imperialism, this “standard of civilization” has subjugated the global South under the North, and the rural under the urban, thereby stratifying the world into multiple overlapping hierarchies structured along core-periphery asymmetries. The globalization of this mode of civilization wouldn’t be possible without the coloniality of power which has assimilated semi-peripheral and peripheral elites into a Western-centric civilizational obsession with endless accumulation based on the “mastery of nature” (Plumwood 2002; Adelman 2015) and geared towards the aggressive pursuit of “high modernism”3 (Scott 1998)—and its “late modern(ist)” continuation. While settler-colonial elites have been instrumental to the expansion of hegemonic civilization, the colonial de-indigenization and cultural assimilation of Southern elites through centuries of Western domination has increasingly entrenched dominant worldviews and practices throughout the globe. Gonzalez notes; “[i]n the post-colonial period, Southern elites, deeply influenced by Eurocentric ideologies, subjugated their own indigenous and minority populations in order to “modernize” and “develop” them” (2015: 13). Most “postcolonial” elites haven’t broken with this coloniality of power (Dastile and Ndlovu-Gastheni 2013); instead, they often reproduce govern-mentalities aimed at “catching-up” with, emulating, imitating, “cloning” or conforming to hegemonic models enacted in the North’s metropolitan cores (Sheppard et.al. 2009; McMichael 2011; Grosfoguel 2009; Mignolo 2008). In seeking to emulate the North’s unsustainable “imperial mode of living” (Brand and Wissen 2012), many Southern elites have replicated the North’s “eco-destructive, consumerist-centric, over-financialized, [and] climate-frying maldevelopment model” (Bond 2012). This coloniality of power has often consumed the creativity, energy, and “resources” of (semi)peripheries in aspirational attempts to emulate and/or conform to hegemonic models by, for example, aggressively pursuing accelerated modernization, developmentalism, urbanization, industrialization, and massified commodity/consumerist cultures at almost any cost, human or ecological. Playing catch-up with the North inevitably requires the present-day rehearsal, in accelerated, compressed manner, of structurally violent practices that have underpinned the North’s “rise” to planetary dominance—like the transformation of nature (including humans) into exploitable “resources” (Apffel-Marglin 2011) and the systematic reliance on coercive statecraft, ecological imperialism, and (neo)colonialism. Comparable practices, now rehearsed in “updated” forms by elites/regimes of semi-peripheral “emerging economies,” seek to replicate expansive core-like metropolitan centers of accumulation, consumption, and growth, like the grossly unequal BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) megalopolises. To achieve this, emerging economies must resort to internal colonialism and “subimperialism” or “second degree imperialism” (Bond 2014) so as to compel into subservience their “own” peripheries as sources of exploitable natural and human “resources.” Yet in striving to emulate a patently unsustainable Northern “way of life” built on centuries of dispossession, emerging economies face two obstacles: First, the hegemonic barriers imposed by the dominant regime of accumulation controlled by the North which resists any challenges to its hegemony. Second, the planetary boundaries (Rockström et.al. 2009) imposed by the Earth’s finite carrying capacity which is already responding to breaches with destabilizing consequences (Foster, Clark, York 2010). Seduced by the coloniality of power, large “emerging economies”—like BRICS—are on a crash course against entrenched “old” Northern cores—as the latter try to preserve their unsustainable privileges at any cost. Brand and Wissen (2012) note: [G]eopolitical and geo-economic shifts will…increasingly be…ecological conflicts…[Facing] increasing competition for the earth’s resources and sinks, national and supranational state apparatuses seem…willing to support ‘their’ respective capitals…to strengthen their competitive position and…secure the resource base of their…economies…Thus, the hegemony of the imperial mode of living…, [spreading from]…the global North…to the South…explains…an imperialist rearticulation…in the context of multiple crises (555). Increasingly volatile tensions are resulting from the clash between the hegemonic system of accumulation and the planetary boundaries. Geopolitical/geoeconomic conflicts, and grabs and scrambles over “resources” strategic for “development(alism),” are proliferating globally. Such complications can often be traced to the hegemonization of an ecologically unsustainable, socially stratifying and politically volatile model of civilization bent on endless accumulation, consumption and growth on a finite planet. Ironically, the very success in globalizing this civilizational model through the coloniality of power may lead to its autophagous self-destruction through a planetary crisis. Overcoming this crisis requires not only a critique of modernity in its neoliberal capitalist guise, but a transformation beyond the systems of power underpinning the hegemonic civilization. In solidarity with movements for systemic change and drawing on decolonial dialogues we conclude with a blueprint for a just and sustainable transition inspired on indigenous, eco-feminist, and posthuman alternatives. Planetary Crisis: Five converging crises are triggering a planetary crisis of civilization: Ecological Rift. Modern civilization is causing an ecological rift with global biospheric lifecycles, breaching planetary boundaries and overshooting the Earth’s carrying capacity by exhausting and disrupting nature’s metabolic labor (Foster, Clark, York 2010; Ahmed 2010; Rockström, Steffen, Noone et.al. 2009; Salleh 2010). We are breaching four of nine planetary boundaries;4 further breaching seems inevitable as we continue to rely on this civilizational model. This anthropogenic eco-crisis is undermining the natural bases for human existence. The ecological rift derives from the anthropocentrism of the hegemonic civilization, aggravated by modernist drives for mastery of nature and capital accumulation, resulting in gross overconsumption of planetary biocapacity: “humanity…uses the equivalent of 1.5 planets to provide the resources we use and absorb our waste… [I]t now takes the Earth one year and six months to regenerate what we use in a year” (World Footprint 2014). Most ecological degradation comes from overconsumption and waste driven by the lifestyle of metropolitan centers globally, and of “(over)developed” rich countries. McMichael (2011) notes: the richest countries have generated 42% of global environmental degradation while paying only 3% of resulting costs. Urban areas occupy around 2% of global land yet produce more than two thirds of CO2 emissions. If everybody in the world lived like the average US or Canadian resident, we would need between three and five Earths—if not more—to regenerate humanity’s annual demand on nature; if everybody lived like the average EU resident, we would need 2.5 to 3.5 Earths. Emergent economies seeking to rapidly catch up and emulate Northern lifestyles—like the BRICS—dramatically aggravate this. This “imperial mode of living” propagated from cores and now also semi-cores is socio-ecologically unsustainable and dangerous (Brand and Wissen 2012). Energy/Resource Depletion. Overconsumption is causing a crisis of energy scarcity and natural resource depletion of oil, natural gas, coal, uranium, essential minerals, and water (Ahmed 2010; Zittel et.al. 2013; Sheppard 2009; Evans 2010; “Water Facts and Figures” 2014). Peak-oil may have already occurred in 2005-2008 (Ahmed 2010); the Energy Working Group estimated overall conventional energy peak for 2015 (Zittel et.al. 2013). Mineral depletion is predicted to exhaust 26 of the 37 most important minerals by 2100 (Sheppard 2009). By 2025 the number of people living in absolute water scarcity is projected to rise 50%, with “two thirds of the world’s population…in water-stressed conditions” (Evans 2010). Food System Crisis: Between 2001-2008 global demand exceeded supply and the global stockpile of grain shrank by half (Cribb 2010). “[A]verage productivity growth rates [2.0% 1970-1990]…fell to 1.1% between 1990 and 2007 and are projected to continue to decline” (Evans 2010:3). Modern industrial agriculture and the consumption/waste patterns of global North and metropolitan lifestyles are exhausting soils and sinks globally. Industrial agriculture through land-use change, synthetic fertilizers and pesticides is eroding soils, creating topsoil loss, and exhausting nature’s “metabolic labor” (Salleh 2010; McMichael 2011). Agro-industrial methods like monocropping and industrial economies of scale destroy biodiversity and carbon sinks, and degrade nutritional quality (Altieri 2009). Industrial aquaculture has fully exploited or overexploited most of the world’s fish stocks. The food system’s increasingly corporate consolidation multiplies social-environmental externalities through overexploitation of natural and human resources and gross maldistribution. The “globalized” methane-releasing “meatified” modern food system requires unnecessarily long transportation and is heavily dependent on dwindling fossil fuels, making it a major greenhouse gas emitter. All this is triggering a global food system crisis, profoundly impacting semi/peripheral regions (Ahmed 2010; McMichael 2011; Cribb 2010; Evans 2010.). However, further growth isn’t the answer. We already produce excess food—albeit of disappointing nutritional quality, yet much is wasted and distribution is so skewed that “providing the additional calories needed by the 13% of the world’s population facing hunger would require just 1% of the current global food supply” (Raworth 2012: 5). By shifting to agroecology, indigenous/small peasant methods, and permaculture, coupled with equitable, redistributive, communal and local economies we can produce more nutritious food, ensure fairer distribution, reduce waste, regenerate biodiversity, and fight climate change(Altieri 2009). Economic/Financial Crisis. The 2008 global economic/financial downturn resulted from contingent, recent-historical, and structural factors. While contingent factors like the housing market collapse and recent-historical factors like neoliberal deregulation of financial markets are crucial, we underline the long-term structural problems. Most importantly the growing disconnection between (a.) an increasingly financialized global economy, (b.) the “real” economy of human production, and (c.) the “real-real” economy of socio-ecological reproduction based on the Earth’s biocapacity to provide “ecological services” (Kallis, Martinez-Alier and Norgaard 2009). The increasingly financialized capitalist economy is grossly abstracted from the real economy of production based on human labor, and from the real-real economy of reproduction based on the socio-ecologically metabolic labor of communities and the planet. The second structural problem is the exploding global inequality coupled with persistent poverty; this notwithstanding the continuous (albeit slowing) growth of the global economy. Again, the issue isn’t that we need more growth, but that we have an increasing concentration of wealth tied to gross maldistribution and rampant waste (according to Credit Suisse, the top 8% of the world’s population concentrates almost 80% of global wealth). The global economic system is based on a faulty notion of endless accumulation propelled by increasingly financialized debt disconnected from its growing social and ecological debt (Ahmed 2010; Foster, Clark, York 2010; Peterson 2010; Kallis, Martinez-Alier and Norgaard 2009; Salleh 2010). Social Reproduction Crisis. This crisis results from the accelerated exploitation of productive and reproductive labor, leading to massive demographic displacements—so-called “migrations”—from rural to urban, and from peripheries to cores. Overconsumption in cores and now also semi-cores requires constantly increasing absorption of people—especially from semi-peripheries and peripheries—into a global system of production geared towards endless growth. For example, people displaced from their local land bases by the globalization and intensification of corporate and/or state mega-projects, industrial monocrops and resource extraction are often absorbed as cheap migrant labor moving towards the exploding slum-settlements of chaotically growing urbanized centers in emerging Southern economies or towards already established Northern centers of accumulation. There, they are incorporated as easily exploitable, often undocumented labor, crossing dangerous, sometimes lethal, and increasingly militarized Northern borders (e.g., the US-Mexico border, the EU’s Mediterranean) (Robinson and Santos 2014). Demographic displacements are aggravated by environmental/climate degradation, oppression and conflicts—many rooted in colonial/postcolonial/neocolonial histories and hegemonic/imperialist wars. Rural to urban and South to North displacements drain the human, cultural, and social-reproductive capabilities of traditional/rural/peasant/agricultural/fishing communities and Southern regions generally (Gasper and Truong 2014). The social reproduction crisis is gendered and racialized, primarily affecting women, peasants, indigenous communities, and people of color (Salleh 2010; Peterson 2010; McMichael 2011). The critical consequences are threefold: the brain drain, the proliferation of migrant/refugee labor, and the care drain. Racialized rural, peasant, indigenous and traditional communities are eroded by the massive transference or displacement of productive, reproductive, and intellectual labor to cities and to the North. Working-age people are being absorbed, often in violent, exploitative and oppressive conditions, into hyper-productive globalized economies of capital accumulation. Concomitantly, many children, elderly, and disabled are marginalized, left uncared for as socially-reproductive labor erodes. The care drain feeds the new genderization and feminization of labor in manufacturing, especially light assembly (e.g., maquiladoras, export-processing zones, sweatshops). Labor feminization draws from migrant female workers coming from rural communities. Communities of origin, deprived of working age females (and males), lose the reproductive labor needed to care for social needs like education, safety, health, child and elderly care, often becoming reliant on migrant remittances. The care drain also feeds the South to North export of female labor to cover for the scarcity of reproductive labor resulting from the absorption of Northern female labor into the “productive” labor force. Moreover, the growing global sex trade absorbs and exploits economically-marginalized women, especially from semi/peripheries. Add gendered—and racialized—labor exploitation in less visible realms like domestic work, care work, and agroindustry. The social reproduction crisis also embeds a health crisis stemming from acute inequality, environmental degradation, neoliberal erosion of public health infrastructures, and deteriorated access to food, water and resources. This health crisis, on the one hand creates the growth of noncommunicable “diseases of globalization” resulting from consumerist, commodity-based, sedentary and industrial lifestyles (e.g., diabetes, coronary heart disease, obesity, hypertension, depression, etc.), while on the other hand it perpetuates in the “Third World” communicable diseases such as malaria and cholera, among many others. This health crisis interacts with other abovementioned crises to further complicate social reproduction and to trigger displacement (Harris and Seid 2004; Schreker 2012; McMichael, Barnett and McMichael 2012; Ottersen, Dasgupta, Blouin et.al. 2014; The Global Health Watch 2014). These crises are partly triggered and aggravated by neoliberalism, including its dismantling of social support networks and ecological protections globally since the 1980s, which set the stage for the globalization of corporate and financial capital at the expense of people and planet. Yet the roots of the planetary crisis are deeper. The planetary crisis, we contend, has resulted from the generalization of a hegemonic mode of civilization underpinned by the layered intersection of anthropocentric, androcentric, heterosexist, rationalist, Euro/Western-centric, modern/colonial, racialized, industrialist/developmentalist, capitalist, and ableist systems of power. These ten systems of power constitute the infrastructures of hegemonic civilization. Upon them, complex discursive and institutional apparatuses have been built and reproduced, asymmetrically shaping relations, practices, and cultures, often in structurally hierarchical, violent, oppressive, and exploitative ways. Such infrastructures buttress vitiated relations among humans and with non-humans, thereby producing, reproducing and accelerating the crises. These infrastructures must be critically and materially deconstructed to enable alternative worldviews, lifeways, organizational forms and practices to flourish. Drawing on decolonial, ecofeminist, posthumanist-ecological, and world-systems analysis we describe these infrastructures and how they feedback on each other:5

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase its prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector in accordance with decolonial rematriation.

#### The role of the judge is to be a scyborg – you should be ideology agnostic. No technology is too dirty for decolonial dreams – the scyborg’s politics is radical pragmatism.

Paperson 17 La, also K. Wayne Yang, an associate professor of ethnic studies at the University of California, San Diego. “A Third University Is Possible” June 2017.

The scyborg’s medium is assemblage. When we take assemblages seriously as both analytical of power and as the medium for it, then the question becomes, how do you hack assemblages? The scyborg is a sculptor of assemblage—s-he splices one machine to another, de/links apparatuses from/to one another, places machines to work in making new machines, disassembles and reassembles the machine. The scyborg can connect Black radical thought to the paper-producing academic–industrial complex and set the print command to “manifesto.” The scyborg is like R2D2 in the Death Star, opening escape tunnels, lowering and raising doors to new passageways, making the death machine run backward, and ultimately releasing the plans for its destruction. The scyborg is an artist in the un/patterning of relations of power.[19] The scyborg loves dirty work.[20] Scyborgs do not care whether the assemblage they are retooling is first, second, or third world. Categorical thinking is not the point. Nothing is too dirty for scyborg dreaming: MBA programs, transnational capital, Department of Defense grants. Scyborgs are ideology-agnostic, which creates possibilities in every direction of the witch’s flight—not just possibilities that we like. This is why some of you are not always decolonial in behavior. Thankfully, your newly assembled machine will break down. Some other scyborgs will reassemble the busted gears to drive decolonial dreams. To dream it is to ride the ruin. Scyborgs are creating the free university. Scyborg desires are connecting the neoliberal motor that drove President Obama’s campaign for tuition-free community college to antipoverty organizing and to critical education. One of the interesting ways this is being done is by connecting free universities to the rhetoric of democracy and citizenship. Democracy is not decolonization. Democratization will expand, at best, the normative class of citizens through reinvestments in settler colonialism and new articulations of antiblackness. However, “democracy” as a discourse was also ready material for assemblage, a gear to attach to build the free university. The dream of universal education is born from the reality of exclusive schooling. This dream may shift as educational expansion creates new imbalances, such as inflated credentials, the devaluing of unschooled knowledge, new gaps between educational training and employment, or gaps between the trained workforce and the available supply of jobs. However, in building the free university assemblage and watching it fall apart, perhaps something unpredictable will come of its ruin. As to what, and whether the free university will be decolonizing, will be answered in scyborg assemblage. To be very clear, I am not advocating for rescuing the university from its own neoliberal desires but rather for assembling decolonizing machines, to plug the university into decolonizing assemblages. Close to my heart, Roses in Concrete Community School opened its doors in 2015 in Ohlone, what some call Oakland, California. This school is part of a larger self-determination project for a mostly Black and Brown community, in which we hope for a pre-K–16 educational institution, community-based economies, and land.[21] Also in 2015, also in what is now called Oakland, longtime Indigenous educators and activists Corrina Gould (Chochenyo/Karkin Ohlone) and Johnella LaRose (Shoshone Bannock) created the first women-led urban Indigenous land trust built upon “the belief that land is the foundation” that can bring all peoples together in “the return of Chochenyo and Karkin Ohlone lands . . . to Indigenous stewardship.” Sogorea Te’ Land Trust also reworks Western concepts of “land tax,” nonprofit status, and inheritance. Decolonizing land relations is the heart that reworks this machinery. Sogorea Te’ not only calls on but indeed provides an avenue for people living in Ohlone lands “to heal from the legacies of colonialism and genocide, to remember different ways of living, and to do the work that our ancestors and future generations are calling us to do.”[22] Nearby Roses in Concrete is an abandoned U.S. Navy base the size of a small town. California community colleges are talking expansion, while the tuition-free college movement had nearly found a federal reality under President Obama. A scyborg might connect these pieces—might imagine how the machines of freedom schools and free community colleges could purchase land, land that could become part of an Indigenous land trust. Roses in Concrete has a sister school in Aoteroa that originated from a Māori bilingual program Te Whānau o Tupuranga (Centre for Māori Education) and Fanau Pasifika (Centre for Pasifika Education), which became a school in 2006 and then became Kia Aroha College in 2011. Similar to Roses, Kia Aroha College is built on a holistic “scholar warrior” culture that developed the school over twenty-five years into a “culturally-located, bilingual learning model based in a secure cultural identity, stable positive relationships, and aroha (authentic caring and love).”[23] This craft of creating Indigenous space in an urban colonial context requires a constant rearrangement of settler law, Indigenous rights, state educational ministry systems, built schooling environments, and community systems of Indigenous education. Furthermore, these associations between school makers in Māori/Pasifika and in U.S. ghetto colonial contexts produce new shared scyborg flight plans. These technologies are driven and repurposed by scyborg desires. Where I am now, on Kumeyaay land at UC San Diego, we are at the confluence of the engineering apparatus, the naval and sea industries, the U.S.– Mexican border, the white utopian project of Black exclusion, the settler project of Native disappearance, the transnational project of international (read model Asian) recruitment. Scyborgs might reorganize these technologies into third university organisms with decolonizing programs: a project of water, a project of transnational/Indigenous solidarity, a project of Black assertion, a project of islands. As I write, Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang (my other I) are supporting a collective of collectives, the Land Relationships Super Collective, that connects different land-based movements across North America with one another to share strategies, resources, learnings, and so on. As Eve and I are both university professors, the university plays into this as an institution that must be refused, and yet also as an organism, an assemblage of machines, that we can make work, make space in, make liquid enough to allow us to contribute to land rematriation projects directly. The third world university will be built by scyborg labor. This is not a revolutionary call for scyborgs of the world to unite. This is a call to gear-in and do the dirty work of desiring machines. Through desires’ dirty work, we might recommission these first world scraps into a third world machine.

#### Another world is possible - reject the fatalist narrative that colonization is insurmountable - efforts to return land to indigenous people can overcome every obstacle.

Coulthard 14 - Glen Sean Coulthard is Associate Professor, Political Science and First Nations and Indigenous Studies at the University of British Columbia, leading settler colonial theorist and author of *Red Skin, White Masks*; Interview by Eric Ritskes, an editor at the *Decolonization* Journal and interviewed with Leanne Simpson, Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg writer, academic and activist and member of Alderville First Nation(“Leanne Simpson and Glen Coulthard on Dechinta Bush University, Indigenous land-based education and embodied resurgence”, 11-26-14, Decolonization: Indigeniety, Education, & Society; https://decolonization.wordpress.com/2014/11/26/leanne-simpson-and-glen-coulthard-on-dechinta-bush-university-indigenous-land-based-education-and-embodied-resurgence/)//JH

Glen: Good answer, Leanne. I couldn’t answer it so eloquently myself so I’m going to address two issues: one, you started interestingly this introduction to urban issues with the caveat, that the acquisition or re-acquisition of land might be more difficult or impossible in certain situations. And I think that we can concede that it might be more difficult by virtues of the structures that exist, the densities of populations and how thoroughly colonial discourse and the structure of dispossession has erased us from these spaces, but we can’t concede to it being impossible. **That’s how it’s pitched, that’s how the enemy posits Indigenous claims**: **because Indigenous peoples have been so damaged by colonialism, because colonialism has been so thorough, it becomes such an absurd idea to think that we could correct this.** It’s a sort of self-perpetuating prophecy – colonialism has damaged us so much and it’s been so thorough, that we no longer have a claim to justice against it. We have to concede, we have to compromise, all these sort of things, which I think is just a **problematic position of ‘we ought not undertake to dream bigger’.** The other thing is this kind of distinction that tends to get made between urban and rural, or land-based, experiences in relation to decolonization and colonization. I think **that kind of binary needs to be broken down,** not only because Indigenous lands are also cities but because the experience of colonization has been, if you look at it in a larger historical view, very similar. Indigenous peoples were dispossessed from their territories. This was **fundamental in the construction of cities and urbanization**. Once you are removed from the land, and once you are removed from your reserve land-base, you have to migrate elsewhere and that’s often urban centers. This was a constitutive feature of what Marx termed primitive accumulation, dispossession, proletariatization, market creation – but also the geographical, spatial reorganization of populations through subsequent urbanization. And now that very colonial process (in Marx’s own terms) is consuming, is devouring again, Indigenous spaces within cities through gentrification. So this constant cycle of dispossession and violence and dispossession and displacement has happened to Indigenous peoples as much in cities as it has in land-based contexts. And, indeed, they’re structurally related. So when we can start seeing that as Indigenous peoples, we can start building a more effective movement that recognizes those similarities, that what we are fighting against is essentially the same thing. We should stop fighting against each other because we see our experiences as being so different; when, if we just take a step back a bit, they aren’t. Eric: You’ve both spoken to the uniqueness of Dechinta; it’s really true one-of-a-kind here in Canada. You’ve had to go through various negotiations to make it happen and its been going for a number of years now – what’s the next step, for Dechinta in particular, but – in thinking through land as pedagogy, land-based education – for Indigenous education in general? Is it more recognition within these systems, creating programs like Dechinta? Is it more individualized, familial resurgence – the sort of sacrifices you mentioned, Leanne, of people choosing to go back to the land, to learning from elders, making those choices? What are the future possibilities of Indigenous land-based education here in Canada? Glen: Again, not speaking on behalf of the more administrative arm of Dechinta, but I think that one of the things that needs to happen is that this type of programming needs to be financially sustainable. That’s a very pragmatic and real question that needs to be addressed. But, also, it’s got to be localized and decentralized, to my mind. Place-based education isn’t univeralizable. You can’t just cookie cutter it into communities; it has to be from that land and those knowledge holders. That takes a lot of hard work and it has to be specific. You can’t just disseminate it out, in this very homogenous sort of programming model, and I think that Dechinta recognizes that. One of the biggest demands that I always hear from students who take the program, every time I’ve taught there, is: “I wish there was something like there where I’m from (if they’re not Yellowknives Dene). I wish there was something like this, how do we go about establishing this on our territory?” And for a truly resurgent, decolonizing, land-based education, I think that needs to happen. **We need to establish a network of these types of educational practices, on territories across** Canada, **on every Indigenous peoples’ territory. Then we’ll have a program for some radical changes.**

#### Decolonial rematriation causes a mindset shift that goes global - cultures respond to the shockby embracing more sustainable relationships with the environment.

Alexander 15—lecturer at the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne (Samuel, *Sufficiency Economy* pg 270-272)

In many ways this final ‘pathway’ could be built into all of the previous perspectives, because none of the theorists considered above (especially the DGR camp) would think that the transition to a deep green alternative could ever be smooth, rational, or painless. Even many radical reformers, whose strategy involves working within the institutions of liberal democracy rather than subverting or ignoring them, clearly expect political conflict and economic difficulties to shape the pathway to the desired alternative (Gilding, 2011). Nevertheless, for those who are deeply pessimistic about the likelihood of any of the previous strategies actually giving rise to a deep green alternative (however coherent or well justified they may be), there remains the possibility that some such alternative could arise not by **design** so much as by **disaster**. In other words, it is worth considering whether a crisis situation – or a series of crises – could either (i) **force an alternative way of life** upon us; or (ii) be **the provocation needed** for cultures or politicians to **take radical alternatives seriously**. Those two possibilities will now be considered briefly, in turn. As industrial civilisation continues its global expansion and pursues growth without apparent limit, the possibility of economic, political, or ecological crises forcing an alternative way of life upon humanity seems to be **growing in likelihood** (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 2013). That is, if the existing model of global development is not stopped via one of the pathways reviewed above, or some other strategy, then it seems clear enough that at some point in the future, industrial civilisation will **grow itself to death** (Turner, 2012). Whether ‘collapse’ is initiated by an ecological tipping point, a financial breakdown of an overly indebted economy, a geopolitical disruption, an oil crisis, or some confluence of such forces, the possibility of collapse or deep global crisis can no longer be dismissed merely as the intellectual playground for ‘doomsayers’ with curdled imaginations. Collapse is a prospect that ought to be taken seriously based on the logic of limitless growth on a finite planet, as well as the evidence of existing economic, ecological, or more specifically climatic instability. As Paul Gilding (2011) has suggested, perhaps it is already too late to avoid some form of ‘great disruption’. Could collapse or deep crisis be the most likely pathway to an alternative way of life? If it is, such a scenario must not be idealised or romanticised. Fundamental change through crisis would almost certainly involve great suffering for many, and quite possibly significant population decline through starvation, disease, or war. It is also possible that the ‘alternative system’ that a crisis produces is equally or even more undesirable than the existing system. Nevertheless, it may be that this is **the only way** a post-growth or post-industrial way of life will **ever arise**. The **Cuban oil crisis**, prompted by the collapse of the USSR, provides one such example of a deep societal transition that arose not from a political or social movement, but from sheer force of circumstances (Piercy et al., 2010). Almost overnight Cuba had a large proportion of its oil supply cut off, forcing the nation to move away from oil-dependent, industrialised modes of food production and instead take up local and organic systems – or **perish**. David Holmgren (2013) published a deep and provocative essay, ‘Crash on Demand’, exploring the idea that a relatively small anti-consumerist movement could be enough to destabilise the global economy, which is already struggling. This presents one means of bringing an end to the status quo by inducing a voluntary crisis, without relying on a mass movement. Needless to say, should people adopt such a strategy, it would be imperative to ‘prefigure’ the alternative society as far as possible too, not merely withdraw support from the existing society. Again, one must not romanticise such theories or transitions. The Cuban crisis, for example, entailed much hardship. But it does **expose the mechanisms** by which crisis can induce **significant societal change** in ways that, in the end, are **not always negative**. In the face of a **global crisis** or **breakdown**, therefore, it could be that elements of the deep green vision (such as organic agriculture, frugal living, sharing, radical recycling, post-oil transportation, etc.) come to be **forced upon humanity**, in which case the question of strategy has **less** to do with **avoiding** a deep crisis or **collapse** (which may be inevitable) and more to do with **negotiating the descent** as wisely as possible. This is hardly a reliable path to the deep green alternative, but it presents itself as a possible path. Perhaps a more reliable path could be based on the possibility that, rather than imposing an alternative way of life on a society through sudden collapse, a deep crisis could provoke a social or political **revolution in consciousness** that **opens up space** for the deep green vision to be **embraced** and **implemented** as some form of crisis management strategy. Currently, there is **insufficient social** or **political support** for such an alternative, but perhaps a **deep crisis** will **shake the world awake**. Indeed, perhaps that is **the only way** to create the **necessary mindset**. After all, today we are hardly lacking in evidence of the need for radical change (Turner, 2012), suggesting that shock and response may be the form the transition takes, rather than it being induced through orderly, rational planning, whether from ‘top down’ or ‘from below’. Again, this ‘nonideal’ pathway to a post-growth or post-industrial society could be built into the other strategies discussed above, adding some realism to strategies that might otherwise appear too utopian. That is to say, it may be that **only deep crisis** will **create the social support** or **political will needed** for radical reformism, eco-socialism, or ecoanarchism to emerge as social or political movements capable of **rapid transformation**. Furthermore, it would be wise to keep an open and evolving mind regarding the best strategy to adopt, because the relative effectiveness of various strategies may change over time, depending on how forthcoming crises unfold.

#### There’s a decolonial imperative. It’s worth risking annihilation to create a social order worth saving. Combating systems of oppression comes before avoiding future catastrophe.

Pinkard 13 2013, Lynice Pinkard, “Revolutionary Suicide: Risking Everything to Transform Society and Live Fully”, Tikkun 2013 Volume 28, Number 4: 31-41, http://tikkun.dukejournals.org/content/28/4/31.full

I’d like to present an alternative to conventional identity politics, one that requires that we understand the way that capitalism itself has grown out of a very particular kind of identity politics — white supremacy — aimed at securing “special benefits” for one group of people. It is not sufficient to speak only of identities of race, class, and gender. I believe we must also speak of identities in relation to domination. To what extent does any one of us identify with the forces of domination and participate in relations that reinforce that domination and the exploitation that goes with it? In what ways and to what extent are we wedded to our own upward mobility, financial security, good reputation, and ability to “win friends and influence people” in positions of power? Or conversely, do we identify (not wish to identify or pretend to identify but actually identify by putting our lives on the line) with efforts to reverse patterns of domination, empower people on the margins (even when we are not on the margins ourselves), and seek healthy, sustainable relations? When we consider our identities in relation to domination, we realize the manifold ways in which we have structured our lives and desires in support of the very economic and social system that is dominating us. To shake free of this cycle, we need to embrace a radical break from business as usual. We need to commit revolutionary suicide. By this I mean not the killing of our bodies but the destruction of our attachments to security, status, wealth, and power. These attachments prevent us from becoming spiritually and politically alive. They prevent us from changing the violent structure of the society in which we live. Revolutionary suicide means living out our commitments, even when that means risking death. When Huey Percy Newton, the cofounder of the Black Panther Party, called us to “revolutionary suicide,” it appears that he was making the same appeal as Jesus of Nazareth, who admonished, “Those who seek to save their lives will lose them, and those who lose their lives for the sake of [the planet] will save them.” Essentially, both movement founders are saying the same thing. Salvation is not an individual matter. It entails saving, delivering, rescuing an entire civilization. This cannot be just another day at the bargain counter. The salvation of an entire planet requires a total risk of everything — of you, of me, of unyielding people everywhere, for all time. This is what revolutionary suicide is. The cost of revolutionary change is people’s willingness to pay with their own lives. This is what Rachel Corrie knew when she, determined to prevent a Palestinian home in Rafah from being demolished, refused to move and was killed by an Israeli army bulldozer in the Gaza Strip. This is what Daniel Ellsberg knew when he made public the Pentagon Papers. It’s what Oscar Schindler knew when he rescued over 1,100 Jews from Nazi concentration camps, what subversive Hutus knew when they risked their lives to rescue Tutsis in the Rwandan genocide. This call may sound extreme at first, but an unflinching look at the structure of our society reveals why nothing less is enough. Before returning to the question of revolutionary suicide and what it might mean in each of our lives, let’s look at what we’re up against. The latest and arguably the most effective in a 5,000-year series of human methodologies for dominating others and the planet, global capitalism binds the majority of the earth’s population in poverty, substitutes consumption for humanity and the love of life, and fosters wanton depletion of the earth’s resources while stuffing the wallets and stock portfolios of a very few people at the top of the system, while at the same time creating and propagating fantasies about upward mobility among the rest of us and distributing paltry but desperately needed benefits that inspire our loyalty to the very system that is brutalizing us. It’s a situation expressed succinctly by Morpheus in The Matrix: The Matrix is a system, Neo. That system is our enemy. But when you are inside and look around, what do you see? Businessmen, teachers, lawyers, carpenters — the very minds of the people we are trying to save. But until we do, these people are still part of that system, and that makes them our enemy. You have to understand, most of these people are not ready to be unplugged and many of them are so inured, so hopelessly dependent on the system, they will fight to protect it. Global capitalism has enabled the United States to become the largest and most powerful empire ever created. The secret of its success is economic imperialism without national expansion. The American capitalist empire is basically a feudal one. Nations are the vassals of America. They keep their populations in line, tithe resources, and keep their markets open to the United States. The price to the United States of international aid (itself a farce), a large military budget, and occasional conflict is more than offset by not having to actively suppress and manage the population of each country. Further, the United States benefits from the conflict between the poor and elite within each country, regional conflicts that keep countries from focusing solely on the United States, and American nationalism that reduces internal conflict within its home base. Its interwoven tensions make it almost impossible to effectively resist. No policy, program, charity, or reform effort will seriously alleviate the oppression perpetrated by global capitalism. We can ease pain and help individuals, but we will not change the basic distribution of wealth, status, or power unless we address the economic system that frames our lives. Just as nature abhors a vacuum, capitalism abhors the equitable distribution of wealth. As new groups of people gain more skills and degrees, they end up merely exchanging places with the people above them as they rise up the economic ladder. Even if they produce wealth as they do so, the law of concentration dictates that the middle class is then further squeezed, ensuring that the net population of poor people is the same if not greater. Unfortunately, conservatives are correct that the only way of increasing the lot of the poor in the United States within the current system is to produce growth by further exploiting the poor in other countries — exactly the trajectory we are now on. While the rich get richer faster, the poor in America have some chance of sharing the crumbs. Those of us who are concerned with justice on a global scale should clearly understand that an increase in social programs — albeit necessary as “aspirin practices” to remediate day-to-day suffering — will never achieve the goals of social justice, no matter how well funded those programs are. Individuals can change their position, and the quality of life for those at the bottom may be slightly improved, but justice will remain elusive. Only a change in the economic structure will accomplish justice. For those of us concerned with global justice, confronting global capitalism is central. To understand what will be required of us in that confrontation, we must first take an unsentimental look at the “state” of affairs. Capitalism Is Protected by the State Throughout history, the U.S. government has served as an immune system for capitalism, one that not only protects it from outside threats (worker uprisings, for example, or Communism), but from internal ones as well. In fact, one of the government’s primary jobs is to protect capitalism from its own excesses. In order for the proper balance to be established, capitalism must first be defined as an integral aspect of the nation, which has been the case for the United States since its founding. All patriotic fairy tales aside, the United States was founded to serve the economic interests of wealthy European and European-descended landowners. The Revolutionary War was organized and financed because wealthy business and plantation owners were tired of being taxed. We are led to believe that the real issue was “taxation without representation,” but are we to believe that they would have enjoyed taxation with representation? At the core, the organizers and financiers of the American Revolution felt that their nation should help them accrue wealth. The nation should serve the wealthy, not vice versa. The fact that women, slaves, and poor people had no voting rights was not a historical oversight. The entire purpose of the new nation was to protect the property rights of wealthy, white men. However, because the United States was a struggling, fledgling nation, national identification was not with the ruling or owning class, but with the worker turned entrepreneur. This is vital: the United States tapped into the true passion of the worker by developing and glorifying the concept of the entrepreneur. Even Marx waxed rhapsodic regarding the heroic nature of the individual struggling to cast off the determination of feudal classes through the gathering of wealth. The United States has understood for centuries that this identification is crucial to its success. This “identity” as an entrepreneurial nation has remained intact through substantial internal transformation and the repositioning of America in the global power struggle. It is, perhaps, the magic ingredient that has allowed capitalism to survive the weaknesses Marx saw at its core. The lure of becoming an entrepreneur, and the endless anecdotal evidence that suggests that anyone (at least in America) can rise from “rags to riches,” have provided the primary safeguard against capitalism’s destruction through worker rebellion. It is true that some European and East Asian immigrant men (and hence their families) were generally able to increase their economic standing over three generations. However, this success was economically possible because of the oppression of women, blacks, Native Americans, Latinos, and others. It was also funded by the exploitation of people in other countries whose stolen labor and resources were used to offset the rising cost of labor in the United States. However, there are times, especially when there is an economic downturn, that the fable of opportunity becomes less comforting. At these times more people begin to notice the extreme concentration of wealth and “the disappearance of the middle class.” It is important to note that the disparities have always been present, even though the extreme wealth of the United States still allows many Americans to purchase considerable comfort. The fact is that this country has the largest percentage of poverty of any industrialized, Western nation. When a critical percentage of the bottom 90 percent begins to become truly discontented, an interesting transition occurs. The government, which during times of growth is seen as a bureaucratic parasite inhibiting the potential and freedom of the individual, now becomes the protector. The government must send a message that the economic system is just fine (early 2008), but that evildoers have been at work. Sometimes Americans are told that the problems result from certain politicians and businesses that have been taking advantage of the freedom offered by capitalism. Other times we’re told that the problem lies with those who have sought to lead the nation away from capitalism. Then the government promotes itself as a “safety net” for those who have “fallen through the cracks” of the system. Programs are established to help the unfortunate. Of course, this is not about bad luck or fortune. The poor are both a required element and a natural byproduct of capitalism. The programs do not have the power or resources required to truly lift people out of poverty and only cause the system to seem benign and resentment to be directed at those who are exploited. All of this goes to show that the United States has effectively established capitalism as essential to the nation’s identity. The United States has repeatedly proved its willingness to protect capitalism above all other things. In exchange for this defense from internal and external enemies, capitalism supposedly tolerates the “restrictions” that government puts in place to guard capitalism from itself — to guard capitalism against monopolies, extreme economic cycles, and exploitation. The Complicity of Civic Institutions We have seen how government and law have been made to serve the perpetuation of global capitalism, and we have also noted how the state — the organizations of the military, the police, and the criminal justice system — will discipline our bodies through force and coercion if we challenge capitalism too directly. But equally powerful are the fortresses of civil society that sit next to the state: all of the religious, legal, educational, and cultural institutions that discipline our minds and emotions and mediate supremacist hegemonies through socialization and consent. One of the most dangerous and intractable challenges posed by a hegemonic society is that hegemony is mediated and reinforced through the material practices of everyday life. Often people are not consciously aware that their consent is being manufactured and that they are being socialized to accept, legitimate, indeed, prop up their own oppression. This is the process of institutionalizing “common sense” so that people take the status quo for granted and assume that it is vital to the maintenance of economic and political “stability.” Take, for example, religion, one of the powerful fortresses of civil society. There is an equivocal nature to religion: it can either mediate hegemony as an opiate or counter hegemony as a revolutionary force. Throughout history we see religion serving imperial hegemony (church support for California’s Proposition 8) and working against it (the Civil Rights Movement). Sadly, the contemporary American church — part of the religious industrial complex and a vassal of the American empire — overwhelmingly serves the interests of the state, which in turn serves the wealthy. My criticism of “the church” does not mean to imply that there are no revolutionary acts of resistance by individual churches, church members, or church leaders. In fact, I am writing as a Christian pastor. Christianity is my home, and because I love the best that this tradition has to offer, I feel compelled to plumb the ruins, identifying and rooting out the distortions that impede the life-giving potential of the gospel. It is important to interrogate the American church as a whole as one of the ideological state apparatuses. The Co-opted American Church In reality, the American church, since its inception, has been feeding on the toxic waste of the American nation-state. Walter Brueggemann, in Mandate to Difference, describes our society as consumerist (“more” equals “safer and happier”), therapeutic (the goal is to live a pain-free, stress-free, undisturbed life of convenience), militaristic (we must protect our entitled advantage and unsustainable lifestyle with force), and technological (visionary alternatives are screened out and eliminated as impractical in favor of small technocratic fixes to the existing systems). The American church, by and large, offers no substantive critique of these assumptions. Inured to the reality of global corporate empire-building and its parasitical processes, it simply has no reason to revolt. Instead, the church, like the consumer-capitalist culture shot all through it, is fixated on “good marketing strategies” and “unlimited growth.” As such, the church cannot foster the Gospel of revolutionary, death-defying self-annihilation in the service of love but can only propagate a glut of Christian material (whether books, plays, movies, or sermons) by entrepreneurial preachers and entertainers, the net effect of which is to keep people at a safe remove from the radically transformative experience of the Gospel. “Christian material” is designed not to trouble and agitate but to reassure. Consequently, our “religion” cannot possibly fulfill its original function of disturbing the peace. The American church cannot bear the truth that, having been utterly co-opted by the economic empire, we now spend much of our time lost in fanciful forms of piety. Week after week, we sit unconscious, consuming sermons that, like dentists’ needles, anesthetize us, lulling us into a pain-suppressing sleep before they defang us, rendering us docile and innocuous. Without teeth, the church, infantilized, is ever ready for its pacifier. Pacifiers come in all shapes and sizes — they don’t ever touch the root of our anguished hunger, but they do at least plug our holes. As it turns out, for generations, the people selling the church and the people consuming it have really been in the same boat. We continue to embrace things that we do not really respect, believe, or love in order to continue buying things that we do not really want or need. If we were dealing only with expensive houses, cars, and clothing, the situation would not be so grave. The trouble is that serious things are bought — war and repression as “peace,” self-interest as “generosity,” greed as “opportunity,” brutality as “national interest,” and exploitation as “the free market” — with the same essential lack of consciousness. The entire culture is consumed in lies, and the Christian church, having fully absorbed this culture, serves to prop up this whole Barnum & Bailey charade. The church has not defected from this systematic men-dacity but has instead helped to foster it. The other institutions of civil society — education, media, law, etc. — serve in similar ways to support the existing exploitative system and manufacture our consent to our own exploitation and oppression. White Supremacy and the Limitations of Identity Politics Also mediated through the institutions of civil society is a deeply embedded assumption of the superiority of white people to people of color, an assumption that both shapes and is continually reinforced by our institutions. White supremacy is the handmaiden of capitalism, serving to fuel, justify, and strengthen it at every turn. It is not by any means a coincidence that the poorest places, both in this country and around the world, are populated primarily by people of color. Some of the most radical criticisms of global capitalism and its hegemonic hold on an increasing proportion of the world’s population have arisen from those most impacted by its effects—indigenous peoples, New World Africans, and queer people of color, many of whom have no illusions that the glittering promises of capitalism will ever deliver for them. So long as these criticisms remain on the margins and do not gain popular credence beyond communities of people who lack the wealth and power to translate them into action, capitalism does not need to worry about them. When these groups begin to organize around the criticisms, however, those criticisms must be domesticated. They must be labeled “special interests” or “identity politics” and must then be subjected to the pressure to find technocratic, “practical” solutions to problems far too deeply embedded in daily life under white supremacist capitalism to be solvable in that way. Campaigns thus come to focus on concrete “rights and privileges,” an attempt to gain something, to acquire something — some consolation prize — from the existing system. Under capitalism, identity politics becomes an effort to move from the margin to the center and so cannot have the goal of dismantling the locations of margin and center. The aim of identity politics is mostly to gain from the dominant culture some sort of recognition of oppressed peoples’ humanity and rights. Identity politics thus appears to accept the dominant culture as the standard, and it wants in. In order to understand why identity politics cannot maintain a radical position vis-à-vis capitalism, we must reckon with the ways in which identity groups have been created by and for the establishment and perpetuation of privileges for a group that is declared to be normative — in our context, wealthy European-descended men. Black identity emerged from the defensive posture that was forced on New World Africans by the hegemonic structure of white supremacy in the American context. (Note: I focus here on the creation of black identity, since I am a black woman, but similar dynamics have played out in the formation of other oppressed and demeaned identity groups.) Thus, black identity is primarily constituted through and organized around the construction of “race” or “blackness” in relation to “whiteness.” It has always been positioned within the socio-discursive field of the dominant culture, which determines, at least in part, both black people’s identity and the ways in which white people maximize the hegemonic mechanisms of white supremacy to support and defend the overall production and maintenance of the status quo. The racialization of human populations (by white men) permits the annihilation of chosen group identities; the degradation of human beings on the basis of arbitrarily identified traits such as skin color, hair texture, and the size and shape of certain features; and the consequent weakening of potential resistance among groups that might otherwise be aligned in opposition to the dominant group. For example, Africans were kidnapped to America with a rich array of cultural difference. Africans had no concept of blackness; there was simply no such thing. Whiteness sought to actively destroy the native cultures of enslaved people, seeing these cultures as a potential power source for discord and resistance. It sought to replace these ethnicities with a uniform “black” slave culture that was based on dependence. Thus the first construction of whiteness was a blackness that was tied to the degradation of African cultures and bodies. When we speak about the limitations of identity politics, therefore, it is important to understand that black identity was framed within the socio-discursive field of white domination; black identity was constructed in the first instance under severely restrictive and repressive conditions. How White Supremacy Rationalizes Economic Exploitation Because blackness was manufactured in the service of white supremacy — the creation and maintenance of power, wealth, and privilege for white people — it is frustrating when white men dismiss identity politics without first interrogating the most successful and destructive identity politics ever practiced (white male supremacy) from which they continue to benefit whether they care to or not, and whether or not they care to admit it. White supremacy has been and continues to be essential to justifying economic exploitation, providing a rationalization for the seizure of both land (e.g., the colonization of the United States and removal of native peoples) and labor (e.g., slavery). To talk about resisting the hegemonic structural injustice produced by capitalism without talking about our differing relationships to capitalism — in essence decontextualizing and depoliticizing the creation, maintenance, and intractability of capitalism — is to ignore the fact that capitalism, from start to finish, serves the interest of wealthy white men and their beneficiaries (families). Although a few “exceptional” individuals of color may manage to gain some limited access to the spoils of capitalism (conditional upon their willingness to remain silent about white supremacy and to accept the tenets of global capitalism), no one has a greater interest in preserving capitalism inviolate than wealthy white men, many of whom represent the American government and work with other wealthy white men in corporations to ensure that capitalism rules. Thus, we cannot talk about identity politics without talking about the identities of wealthy white men whose identity politics has throughout history consisted in “class warfare.” We must talk about whiteness as the vehicle of capitalism, and yet everything in the culture seeks to keep whiteness invisible, shrouded in a veil of secrecy so that the spoils of white supremacy can continue to be enjoyed by white people, and mostly by wealthy white men. The racialization of human populations (by white men with recourse to the “science” of race put forth in 1684 by Francois Bernier as a means of classifying human bodies) is the power play that permits the dehumanization of social groups, the annihilation of group identity, and the consequent depoliticization of group oppression. Group identity becomes “political” in a visible way (as opposed to the invisible politics of white supremacy) when the social space that culture creates is violated. The pervasive, persistent, intractable racism that black people suffer in America solidifies a primary group identity based in a shared sense of collective assault. Black people’s bodies, wherever they go, are constantly signifying; white supremacy begins with the degradation of the African body, which is marked out as different and disgusting and thus subject to economic and political oppression as well as violence and every form of molestation, whereas white bodies are the unmarked marker, the stand-in for normalcy and rightness. In this cauldron of suffering is black identity politics born. It gains its power by connecting oppressed groups to a tradition of struggle, faith, and hope in resisting just this structure of totalizing oppression. White Male Identity Politics It is not just inadequate but offensive, given the success of white male identity politics in amassing wealth, power, and status for wealthy white men, to say that identity politics doesn’t matter or isn’t effective: white identity politics has been the most effective means in history of ruling the world and has done so by attempting to sever people of color from their histories of struggle, faith, and hope. It is not true that all we need to do is turn away from identity politics and prioritize the struggle against capitalism, nor is it true that if we address the economic system, racism will no longer be a problem — both sentiments heard more frequently since the 2008 economic crash, when many ordinary white men and women who had invested (materially and/or psychologically) in capitalism found that it didn’t work out. Their disillusionment is real and important — they have been duped — but the con artist is not just capitalism but also its secret, invisible conjoined twin, whiteness. Together, these two literally rule the world. Although there is almost no support for those who wish to acknowledge it, white people, too, have been destroyed by “whiteness” — the unmarked marker — which has enabled vastly diverse European and European-descended people to trade their cultures (the social space that creates positive group identity based on uniqueness from other groups) for power and privilege. Much of the discontent among white people over the last five years comes from the ways in which whiteness has only delivered its promised wealth and power to the elite. The majority of white people find themselves without much access and also, now, without the enlivening cultures that might have sustained them in its absence. Many of them then blame their suffering not on the faulty notion of whiteness — a fiction invented to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few wealthy landowners — but on a broken economic system, or worse, on “racial minorities” who have managed to eke out some tiny fraction of the American pie through “identity politics” or “special interests.” When so maligned, people of color rightly point out that it is white group identity that makes white people as a group believe they are entitled to more than they are getting. “White people,” they might say, “step into a world that they already own by virtue of the ways their bodies (do not) signify, and your primary complaint, white man, is that some white people have a greater portion of the world than you do.” And then these groups, for pointing out the unspeakable truth of white supremacy, are accused of practicing “identity politics.” It is misguided in the extreme. We Are Not Individually Salvageable White supremacy in all its forms, including the Left’s tendency to want to dismiss identity politics in favor of the work of dismantling capitalism, works against any ability to build principled coalitions to alleviate suffering, much less to confront global capitalism. It is true that identity politics as it is currently practiced under capitalism cannot help us dismantle capitalism. Not only has it too bought into achieving benefits from the existing system, but it also assumes that separate identity groups can achieve liberation from oppression in silos. Salvation does not consist merely in saving more than 40 million Americans who are black, more than 8 million Americans who are self-avowedly gay or lesbian, groups of children, those who are differently abled, immigrants, and those who are illiterate or poor. It consists in saving an entire civilization. Particularly in America, we love this language of oppressor and oppressed. Yet, what Americans through history have failed to grasp is that although constructs of race, class, gender, the body, and sexuality have been oppressive to people of color, the impoverished, women, and queer folks, when any group participates in the dehumanization of “others,” that group destroys its own humanity. I have grown tired of people saying, “What can we do for you — you poor, you blacks, you women, you gays and lesbians?” There is nothing you can do for me. There is nothing you can do for us; it must be done for you! It must be done for the salvation of an entire civilization, of an entire planet. And that — saving an entire planet — is going to require all of us, working together and risking everything — you, me, everything that we have worked for — and continuing to do that forever. Transforming our Relation to Domination Capitalism is ubiquitous and hegemonic: it uses the middle class and the poor to bolster its capacity to accumulate and generate wealth through parasitic growth processes, co-optation, and manipulation. For this reason, I believe that no frontal assault can effectively dismantle the capitalist system. Therefore, it is futile to mount a resistance to 5,000 years of organizing human societies on models of domination by means of identity politics (equal rights for people of color, equal rights for women, equal rights for working people, equal rights for gays and lesbians, and justice for this one and that one). The problem is that no number of “rights” takes us outside the imperial framework. We can call formal equality progress if we want to, but substantive equality is more difficult when we are still in the same structure of domination that by its very nature demands that people be pitted against each other for survival on one side and for power on the other. And ultimately we create and recreate a self-fulfilling prophecy of ever more devastating individualism, greed, and violence. As such, it is necessary to speak of identities of race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and nationality; we must understand that we are not starting from a level playing field. We do not all have the same relationship to capitalism. And we cannot begin to understand, much less undermine, the workings of global capitalism without also recognizing its often-overlooked conjoined twin, kyriarchy (the set of interconnected social systems built around domination), which is replicated continually in our organizing efforts and which can only ever undermine them. We Americans of goodwill are very cruelly trapped between what we say we would like to be (free, loving, generous, and peaceful), and what we refuse to say we actually are (parasites, dominators, supremacists, consumers of more than our share of every kind of resource). And we cannot possibly become what we would like to be until we are willing to articulate who and where we are. However, it is not sufficient to articulate our identities through the categories of race, class, and gender. We must also discuss the extent to which we identify with the forces of domination and participate in relations that maintain their power. Interculturalism I call this radical process interculturalism, a relational practice that, in my experience, leads to principled coalitions across various power-laden lines. Interculturalism means that we move beyond multiculturalism. Multiculturalism as it is generally implemented both accepts whiteness as the standard and affirms whiteness by mimicking inclusion, while truly forcing sameness. Within most forms of multi-culturalism, only bite-sized elements of culture are presented. They are ripped from their political, philosophical, and historical contexts to be easily consumed. This inability to root culture in real circumstances or to discuss injustice in a meaningful way reinforces the lie that “everything is just fine.” It makes white people feel that the dismembered parts of the cultures that they are allowed to consume — these culture McNuggets — are complete, wholesome, and normal. In effect, multiculturalism merely places cultures side by side without seriously interrogating the obstacles (power and dominance) that prevent authentic community. Interculturalism demands that we interrogate cultures of power and privilege that work against our common life, while simultaneously working to overcome internalized forms of oppression. In other words, interculturalism requires that people on the upper sides and undersides of history interrogate our own cultural identities and lay down whatever cultural forms inhibit our full aliveness. Through deep, full-on, honest engagement with each other across traditional divides, we seek transformation into something new. We engage a gestational process that involves being born again and growing up again in a way that sheds the ignorance, defensiveness, self-congratulation, elitism, and paternalism that are evidenced in so much “social justice” and “diversity” work. At a group level, this means that we have to transition from civil rights agitation per se through identity politics (campaigns for marriage equality, racial justice, equal rights for women, recognition of people with disabilities) to a revolutionary cause demanding nothing less than a comprehensive restructuring of American life — everything from its institutions and laws to its basic economic system. We have to be a threat to the establishment by producing a generation of intrepid revolutionaries relentlessly committed to modeling a way of life that begins to pull capitalism apart, brings about revolutionary change, and makes revolution go viral. Impractical Solutions I want to make clear from the outset that I do not have a practical solution to the horrors of global capitalism because there is no such solution. Practical solutions would seek to avoid posing a threat to the current system, to preserve our lives, as we know them, and to ensure our temporal success. So, my reflections and suggestions are not practical. On the other hand, a prophetic, radical, indeed feral life of resistance that leads to liberation presupposes both sacrifice and suffering. Neither stability nor success, as they are defined in the society, can be part of our criteria for a revolutionary “religious” or ethical life. We are in a nosedive toward death, and to interrupt the death throes, we must of necessity buy out of the collective death systems of our culture. We cannot even contemplate real resistance without a commitment to extricating ourselves from these death systems, because these systems, by definition, are killing us physically and mentally and decimating the planet. Even if we continue to exist, our revolutionary inclinations are dissipated and our commitments thwarted, and we become catatonic zombie consumers joining in lockstep obedience to the existing death march. Although many Americans criticize capitalist systems and bemoan their negative effects, we do not often focus on the degree to which our own lives as we have known them rely upon these systems. To the degree that we want to maintain our lives intact, we are going to balk at any course of action that truly threatens the status quo, because a confrontation with a system so entrenched is going to cost us our lives, either our physical lives or our reputation as “being someone” in the world. This means that any revolt against capitalism will need to be inextricably linked to a unifying (not unanimous) set of spiritual beliefs and practices that give us the resilience to withstand the death-dealing assault of the imperial powers and all their sustaining institutions and ideologies. Revolutionary Suicide I call this set of spiritual beliefs and practices “revolutionary suicide.” This is resistance with meaning: creation and action emerging out of the struggle for life. It is not the supplication of protest, the futile hope for a better day, the search for love and self in the faces of children, the self-indulgent staking out of a political position, or the reckless descent into disorder. It is self-determination with integrity. It is the assertion of life without apology. It is the creation that is disturbing by its nature. It is the willingness to defend what we love — life itself — with our lives. Mikhail Bakunin, in his Revolutionary Catechism, reminds us that “the first lesson a revolutionary must learn is that [she] is a doomed [woman].” Until a revolutionary understands this, she does not grasp the essential meaning of her life. Once a revolutionary has reckoned with the fact that she is a dead person, she can get on with the business of asking who she is going to be now and how she will live out her new life. In effect, this recognition, acceptance, and engagement of death enables us collectively to move away from personal suicide — the taking of our own lives in reaction to social, political, and economic conditions that leech the meaning from life, devastate relationships, and lead us to despair. We move away from apathy, fear, despair, and inertia, and we move away from their resultant practices of addiction, consumption, violence, greed, and self-murder to revolutionary suicide. When we have truly reckoned with the cost of being fully alive — deciding to love life no matter what — and we are willing to pay that cost, then and only then can we, intrepid and relentless, refuse to be props for the systems of exploitation, refuse to live extravagantly on the backs of poor people everywhere, refuse to be employed by death-dealing institutions, refuse to be “good insurance risks,” refuse to be saddled with credit worthiness that enables us to accumulate debt that fuels an economic death system, and refuse to pay war taxes. Then we will refuse a living death, even if this means being killed by the forces we are opposing because we deem it better to oppose deathly forces than to endure them. And then, even if we must die, in Alice Walker’s words, we will be “qualified to live among [our] dead.”

#### Let justice be done though the heavens fall. Sacrificial logics are profoundly unethical and culminate in the apocalypses they are intended to prevent. It’s better for all of us to die together than to preserve a system that murders, tortures, and humiliates some for the benefit of the rest.

Santos 3 2003, Boaventura de Souza Santos is a Professor of Sociology at the University of Coimbra, “Collective Suicide?”, Bad Subjects, Issue # 63 , http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage" , to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.

#### Reject “Settler common sense” - scientific rationality is an inadequate approach to understanding the world - Western knowledge production operates in service of settler colonialism.

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Chapter III: Mainstream Economics and Settler Colonial Epistemology “Real progress in economics, as in all sciences, presupposes real world involvement, not only self-referential deductive reasoning within formal-analytical mathematical models” (Syll, 2016, p. 21) The production of knowledge is not innocent; certain epistemologies tend to categorize, improving management and control; this affects and forms the world. In the case of imperial governance, “predicting and accounting for the minds of empire’s Others is a competence on which governance depends” (Stoler, 2008, p. 355). As such, European imperial formations were premised on the racial categorization of subjects. However, with blurring lines of physical (racial) differentiation between European and non-European subjects, epistemic anxieties complicate the guidance of colonial administrators (Stoler, 2008). In other words, the “tactical register”—the framework that distinguishes ‘you’ from ‘others’, as provided by the so-called ‘science of race’—was not always an efficient tool for the colonizers (Stoler, 2008, p. 360). Therefore, the resultant epistemic choice (i.e. how racial belonging or political desires are assessed) for colonial agents “depended on a reading of sensibilities [beyond] science, on a measure of affective states—of affiliations and attachments” (Stoler, 2008, p. 352). The way we see the world and each other within it does matter since it predicates how wealth and rights (and freedoms) are distributed (Stoler, 2008). Furthermore, as anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler (2008) implicitly indicates, the character of the producers (and possessors) of knowledge also matters to the configuration of institutions and society. In a Settler colonial society, knowledge production can serve to dispossess and eliminate Indigenous peoples. Professors Eve Tuck and Rubén Gaztambide-Fernández (2013, p. 74) argue, “Settler colonialism is typified by its practiced epistemological refusal to recognize the latent relations of the settler colonial triad47; the covering of its track.” In other words, Settler colonial societies produce knowledge that covers the systematic and structural oppressive delineations underlying its institutions and cultures. This involves forgetting the past, yet present, to draw convenient Settler futurities, or as Stoler (2008, p. 353) puts it, “Epistemic practice focused not what had occurred but on what could be in the future.” The exclusive object of investigation for this chapter is the epistemology of mainstream economics in the context of Settler colonialism. How are economic relationships (i.e. the exchange of goods/services) studied in a Settler society in pursuit of land and the elimination of Indigenous personhood? To develop part of the answer, we follow the ‘logic of elimination’: Settler colonizers seek to “liquidate” Indigenous societies and finally “erect a new colonial society on the expropriated land base” (Wolfe, 2006, p. 388)—Indigenous peoples are politically out of view; they do not exist anymore; there is no resistance; Settler society is absolutely uncontested. However, Indigenous theorists have pointed to the logic’s paradox. Indigenous peoples and nations are still very much alive, and are in fact resisting colonialism and blossoming from within their communities (Simpson L., 2011). If there is no logic, is it still common sense? The settler common sense, as studied by Marc Rifkin (2013, pp. 322-3), views the project of settlement—“the exertion of control by non-Natives over Native peoples and lands”—as part of the “ordinary, non reflexive conditions of possibility”. In my opinion, common sense says that Settler colonialism is not a complete assumption in Settler societies, but still mostly part of its historical ontological progression. Therefore, a more suitable, yet similar, question is posed: How does the epistemology of economics exhibit the Settler common sense, reproducing the Settler colonial venture of land through elimination and dispossession? In order to inform the investigation of Settler colonial epistemological tendencies in economics, the pertinence of accounting methodologies for colonial ambitions will be demonstrated as structurally and systematically persistent within colonial governance institutions, especially in the context of Canada. The second section of this chapter reviews general orthodox and feminist critiques of economics epistemology. All in all, there is a growing academic consensus that reveals mainstream economics’ obsessive reliance on mathematics, deduction and rationality, allegedly generating knowledge for a controllable, manageable and predictable society. Finally, since there is yet no literature with an explicit critical Settler colonial appraisal of economics epistemology, the arguments forming the final section will be drawn from and inspired by the overall heterodox assessment, Settler colonial studies, and Indigenous feminist theories. My conclusions will ultimately be a mix of each critical approach. As such, the third and fourth sections investigate the potential for epistemological erasure49 inherent within the methodologies of mainstream economics. Revolutionarily, Indigenous refusal breaks the ‘logic of elimination’, as envisioned by Settler common sense, as well as the oppressive epistemology of mainstream economics, to generate and affirm Indigenous political-economic resurgence. Finally, I conclude with my final thoughts about this chapter.

# 2AC

## Adv

### 2AC---Framing---AT: Utilitarianism

#### 2nd - pluriversality - util fails to respect the separateness of cultures - it condemns indigenous ways of life as “inefficient” and demands that indigenous people give up traditional practices for ones that “maximize utilty.”

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It is here that pluriversality as a value enters. Pluriversality as a value suggests that practices, worldviews, values, or policies are legitimate only if they remain compatible with the existence of other worlds. In this sense, pluriversality sets a standard of legitimacy that would judge as morally wrong any worldview, value or practice that does not accept the existence of, or that works to shut down, other worlds. That is not necessarily to say, though, that those holding such views ought to be excluded from dialogue. There is a tension, then, between the two aspects of pluriversality. Giving ultimate priority to one aspect cannot solve this tension. Without any reflection on its emergence from pluriversal dialogue, the substantive value of pluriversality would become a new abstract, already-universal design, and would undermine all commitment to taking seriously as producers of knowledge those that are marginalised. Without the substantive value, there is no way of identifying why a dialogue that takes seriously multiple cosmovisions is a morally good thing. Nor would there be any way of casting any judgment on or identifying as morally wrong certain visions – racist visions, sexist visions, visions that advocate a form of modernity that inevitably reproduces coloniality. Both aspects of pluriversality must remain, and decolonial global ethics must find ways of navigating (if not resolving) any tension between them. It will be for pluriversal dialogue to find ways of navigating this potentially irresolvable tension. To offer some ideas to any such discussion, it is worth noting that the substantive value of pluriversality has emerged, in practice, through pluriversal exchanges in indigenous, peasant (Martinez-Torres and Rosset, 2014), feminist (Leinius, 2014) and World Social Forum praxis (Conway and Singh, 2011). Having emerged as an abstract value through concrete, intercultural dialogue, it can, in turn, retrospectively account for why it is that such dialogue is, normatively speaking, a good thing. One might also note that the abstract value of a world in which other worlds are possible does not give rise immediately to concrete values, practices, policies and attitudes. Understanding what kind of practices, policies, and modes of behaving and living enable other worlds to exist, and fostering the kind of respect for other worlds that such practices and ways of living may require, requires pluriversal dialogue, for it is through such exchanges that it will become apparent that certain demands and ways of living can and do result in the oppression of others. Both aspects of pluriversality can thus be mutually enriching in practice, despite the potential for tension between them. Whilst there is not room to introduce them in depth here, any readers inclined to think that this tension makes decolonial ethics unworkable, hopelessly idealistic and of no use in the “real world” would be advised to explore the practices of the social movements that navigate these tensions. Related to this difference between the two aspects of pluriversality are tensions between decoloniality as an option and decoloniality as an imperative. For Mignolo, there will be no place for one option to pretend to be the option. The decolonial option is not aiming to be the one. It is just an option that, beyond asserting itself as such, makes clear that all the rest are also options (Mignolo 2011, 21). Similarly, what we put on the table is an option to be embraced by all those who find in the option(s) a response to his or her concern and who will actively engage, politically and epistemically, to advance projects of epistemic and subjective decolonisation and in building communal futures (Mignolo, 2011, xxvii). This weaker version of decoloniality appears not to rule out, as incompatible with decolonial global ethics, other visions. ‘Western civilization’ would then, Mignolo (2011, 176) suggests, ‘merely be one among many options, and not the one guide to rule the many.’ The decolonial option serves to add another option to the table. It does not necessarily reject Western modernity, liberal cosmopolitanism, or other positions, provided that they, too, present themselves only as an option. When understanding pluriversality in terms of its procedural aspect, this makes perfect sense. It would be wrong to set out, in advance, one option as an imperative, as one we ought to follow, albeit in different ways. The worry with this weaker version, however, is that it risks ‘losing the ability for critique’ (Alcoff, 2012, 6) and becoming a relativism of anything goes. For Grosfoguel (2012, 101), by contrast, pluriversality is not ‘a relativism of anything goes’. Similarly, for Dussel (2012, 19), a decolonial perspective does ‘not presuppose the illusion of a non-existent symmetry between cultures’. Instead, it acknowledges that some cultures, cosmovisions, and livelihoods are systematically threatened by others and cannot survive in the face of cosmovisions and lifestyles that are inextricably tied to the ceaseless extraction of resources, the dispossession of people and poor working conditions. These perspectives follow when the substantive value of pluriversality is invoked. If the practices, institutions and lifestyles that we associate with modernity continue to depend upon and be constituted by coloniality, then these are not compatible with a world in which other worlds fit. It is for this reason that Dussel suggests that decolonial liberation is ‘impossible for capitalism’ and must not accept the colonial matrix of power ‘as a whole’ (Dussel, 2013, 138). Though Mignolo primarily presents decoloniality as an option, at other times he suggests that ‘pluriversal futures…are only possible if the reign of economic capitalism ends’, on the basis that economic capitalism provides space only for practices that can be turned into, or do not obstruct, profits, and hence does not allow different worlds to exist on equal terms (Mignolo, 2011, 292). This article is not the place to analyse the validity of Mignolo and Dussel’s accounts of capitalism. The point is to suggest that decoloniality should be considered an imperative, and not just an option to be placed on the table. So understood, decolonial global ethics goes beyond a relativism of anything goes. Any option that inevitably depends upon the systematic destruction of other words would violate the principle of a world in which many worlds fit. Decoloniality, and its central value – pluriversality – invoke stringent demands that rule out a number of worlds, practices, and lifestyles. It identifies as wrong a world of economic capitalism if and insofar as it inevitably depends on, and cannot be reformed to prevent, the destruction of other worlds. It identifies as wrong practices of resource extraction, if and insofar as they destroy the livelihoods of peasant and indigenous peoples. It identifies as wrong highly polluting lifestyles, if and insofar as they lead to the destruction of the lives and cosmovisions of those who are dispossessed and displaced as a result of environmental change. It means, finally, that Western civilization as we know it cannot be one legitimate option among many if and insofar as it is constituted through, and cannot be separated from, coloniality. If decolonial global ethics is to unpick the colonial matrix of power and liberate people(s) from domination, it must be an imperative. It must be understood, as it is by Mignolo (2011, 23) in one of his stronger statements, as a project ‘which all contending options would have to accept’. This does not mean that decoloniality and pluriversality offer a singular and rigid global design. A pluriversal world is one in which multiple options are possible – a world in which many worlds can co-exist. Whilst other options would be circumscribed insofar as they would have to accept the decolonial imperative of working towards a pluriversal world, this still leaves room for many options, many possible lives, livelihoods and cosmovisions. Only those worlds that involve, inextricably, the continued domination of others are judged as wrong (though it may well be the case that such views should not be excluded from dialogue, given that dialogue itself may help enrich the kind of mutual respect that would lead to the abandonment of such views). Far from invoking a relativism of anything goes, this principle is a demanding one, with radical implications for global social structures and ways of living. The building of a pluriverse is and must be an open-ended project, fed by dialogues amongst actors from across the world. Moreover, the demand of a pluriverse may be impossible to meet fully; in an interconnected world, it may be impossible to ensure that it is not the case that the actions of some constrain the worlds of others. This does not mean, however, that some worlds, practices, livelihoods, lifestyles, and institutional designs are not more compatible with a pluriverse than others. Recognising interconnectedness – and the long history of interconnectedness – only increases the importance of striving for a pluriversal world in an attempt to build a world free from the domination and destruction of the colonial matrix of power.

### 2AC---Framing---Epistemology

#### Empirics prove that their so-called “experts” are totally incapable of making accurate predictions

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It is the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlock’s new book, “Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?” (Princeton; $35), that people who make prediction their business—people who appear as experts on television, get quoted in newspaper articles, advise governments and businesses, and participate in punditry roundtables—are no better than the rest of us. When they’re wrong, they’re rarely held accountable, and they rarely admit it, either. They insist that they were just off on timing, or blindsided by an improbable event, or almost right, or wrong for the right reasons. They have the same repertoire of self-justifications that everyone has, and are no more inclined than anyone else to revise their beliefs about the way the world works, or ought to work, just because they made a mistake. No one is paying you for your gratuitous opinions about other people, but the experts are being paid, and Tetlock claims that the better known and more frequently quoted they are, the less reliable their guesses about the future are likely to be. The accuracy of an expert’s predictions actually has an inverse relationship to his or her self-confidence, renown, and, beyond a certain point, depth of knowledge. People who follow current events by reading the papers and newsmagazines regularly can guess what is likely to happen about as accurately as the specialists whom the papers quote. Our system of expertise is completely inside out: it rewards bad judgments over good ones. “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices. Tetlock also found that specialists are not significantly more reliable than non-specialists in guessing what is going to happen in the region they study. Knowing a little might make someone a more reliable forecaster, but Tetlock found that knowing a lot can actually make a person less reliable. “We reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge disconcertingly quickly,” he reports. “In this age of academic hyperspecialization, there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals—distinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on—are any better than journalists or attentive readers of the New York Times in ‘reading’ emerging situations.” And the more famous the forecaster the more overblown the forecasts. “Experts in demand,” Tetlock says, “were more overconfident than their colleagues who eked out existences far from the limelight.” People who are not experts in the psychology of expertise are likely (I predict) to find Tetlock’s results a surprise and a matter for concern. For psychologists, though, nothing could be less surprising. “Expert Political Judgment” is just one of more than a hundred studies that have pitted experts against statistical or actuarial formulas, and in almost all of those studies the people either do no better than the formulas or do worse. In one study, college counsellors were given information about a group of high-school students and asked to predict their freshman grades in college. The counsellors had access to test scores, grades, the results of personality and vocational tests, and personal statements from the students, whom they were also permitted to interview. Predictions that were produced by a formula using just test scores and grades were more accurate. There are also many studies showing that expertise and experience do not make someone a better reader of the evidence. In one, data from a test used to diagnose brain damage were given to a group of clinical psychologists and their secretaries. The psychologists’ diagnoses were no better than the secretaries’. The experts’ trouble in Tetlock’s study is exactly the trouble that all human beings have: we fall in love with our hunches, and we really, really hate to be wrong. Tetlock describes an experiment that he witnessed thirty years ago in a Yale classroom. A rat was put in a T-shaped maze. Food was placed in either the right or the left transept of the T in a random sequence such that, over the long run, the food was on the left sixty per cent of the time and on the right forty per cent. Neither the students nor (needless to say) the rat was told these frequencies. The students were asked to predict on which side of the T the food would appear each time. The rat eventually figured out that the food was on the left side more often than the right, and it therefore nearly always went to the left, scoring roughly sixty per cent—D, but a passing grade. The students looked for patterns of left-right placement, and ended up scoring only fifty-two per cent, an F. The rat, having no reputation to begin with, was not embarrassed about being wrong two out of every five tries. But Yale students, who do have reputations, searched for a hidden order in the sequence. They couldn’t deal with forty-per-cent error, so they ended up with almost fifty-per-cent error. The expert-prediction game is not much different. When television pundits make predictions, the more ingenious their forecasts the greater their cachet. An arresting new prediction means that the expert has discovered a set of interlocking causes that no one else has spotted, and that could lead to an outcome that the conventional wisdom is ignoring. On shows like “The McLaughlin Group,” these experts never lose their reputations, or their jobs, because long shots are their business. More serious commentators differ from the pundits only in the degree of showmanship. These serious experts—the think tankers and area-studies professors—are not entirely out to entertain, but they are a little out to entertain, and both their status as experts and their appeal as performers require them to predict futures that are not obvious to the viewer. The producer of the show does not want you and me to sit there listening to an expert and thinking, I could have said that. The expert also suffers from knowing too much: the more facts an expert has, the more information is available to be enlisted in support of his or her pet theories, and the more chains of causation he or she can find beguiling. This helps explain why specialists fail to outguess non-specialists. The odds tend to be with the obvious. Tetlock’s experts were also no different from the rest of us when it came to learning from their mistakes. Most people tend to dismiss new information that doesn’t fit with what they already believe. Tetlock found that his experts used a double standard: they were much tougher in assessing the validity of information that undercut their theory than they were in crediting information that supported it. The same deficiency leads liberals to read only The Nation and conservatives to read only National Review. We are not natural falsificationists: we would rather find more reasons for believing what we already believe than look for reasons that we might be wrong. In the terms of Karl Popper’s famous example, to verify our intuition that all swans are white we look for lots more white swans, when what we should really be looking for is one black swan. Also, people tend to see the future as indeterminate and the past as inevitable. If you look backward, the dots that lead up to Hitler or the fall of the Soviet Union or the attacks on September 11th all connect. If you look forward, it’s just a random scatter of dots, many potential chains of causation leading to many possible outcomes. We have no idea today how tomorrow’s invasion of a foreign land is going to go; after the invasion, we can actually persuade ourselves that we knew all along. The result seems inevitable, and therefore predictable. Tetlock found that, consistent with this asymmetry, experts routinely misremembered the degree of probability they had assigned to an event after it came to pass. They claimed to have predicted what happened with a higher degree of certainty than, according to the record, they really did. When this was pointed out to them, by Tetlock’s researchers, they sometimes became defensive. And, like most of us, experts violate a fundamental rule of probabilities by tending to find scenarios with more variables more likely. If a prediction needs two independent things to happen in order for it to be true, its probability is the product of the probability of each of the things it depends on. If there is a one-in-three chance of x and a one-in-four chance of y, the probability of both x and y occurring is one in twelve. But we often feel instinctively that if the two events “fit together” in some scenario the chance of both is greater, not less. The classic “Linda problem” is an analogous case. In this experiment, subjects are told, “Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.” They are then asked to rank the probability of several possible descriptions of Linda today. Two of them are “bank teller” and “bank teller and active in the feminist movement.” People rank the second description higher than the first, even though, logically, its likelihood is smaller, because it requires two things to be true—that Linda is a bank teller and that Linda is an active feminist—rather than one. Plausible detail makes us believers. When subjects were given a choice between an insurance policy that covered hospitalization for any reason and a policy that covered hospitalization for all accidents and diseases, they were willing to pay a higher premium for the second policy, because the added detail gave them a more vivid picture of the circumstances in which it might be needed. In 1982, an experiment was done with professional forecasters and planners. One group was asked to assess the probability of “a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983,” and another group was asked to assess the probability of “a Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983.” The experts judged the second scenario more likely than the first, even though it required two separate events to occur. They were seduced by the detail. It was no news to Tetlock, therefore, that experts got beaten by formulas. But he does believe that he discovered something about why some people make better forecasters than other people. It has to do not with what the experts believe but with the way they think. Tetlock uses Isaiah Berlin’s metaphor from Archilochus, from his essay on Tolstoy, “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” to illustrate the difference. He says: Low scorers look like hedgehogs: thinkers who “know one big thing,” aggressively extend the explanatory reach of that one big thing into new domains, display bristly impatience with those who “do not get it,” and express considerable confidence that they are already pretty proficient forecasters, at least in the long term. High scorers look like foxes: thinkers who know many small things (tricks of their trade), are skeptical of grand schemes, see explanation and prediction not as deductive exercises but rather as exercises in flexible “ad hocery” that require stitching together diverse sources of information, and are rather diffident about their own forecasting prowess. A hedgehog is a person who sees international affairs to be ultimately determined by a single bottom-line force: balance-of-power considerations, or the clash of civilizations, or globalization and the spread of free markets. A hedgehog is the kind of person who holds a great-man theory of history, according to which the Cold War does not end if there is no Ronald Reagan. Or he or she might adhere to the “actor-dispensability thesis,” according to which Soviet Communism was doomed no matter what. Whatever it is, the big idea, and that idea alone, dictates the probable outcome of events. For the hedgehog, therefore, predictions that fail are only “off on timing,” or are “almost right,” derailed by an unforeseeable accident. There are always little swerves in the short run, but the long run irons them out. Foxes, on the other hand, don’t see a single determining explanation in history. They tend, Tetlock says, “to see the world as a shifting mixture of self-fulfilling and self-negating prophecies: self-fulfilling ones in which success breeds success, and failure, failure but only up to a point, and then self-negating prophecies kick in as people recognize that things have gone too far.”

### 2AC---AT: Ontological Security

#### Reactionaries inev as a result of capitalism

Bhabani Shankar Nayak 20, political economist and Professor in Business Management and Programme Director of Business, Management and Marketing, University for the Creative Arts, UK, “Globalization Of Capitalist Crises – OpEd,” Eurasia Review 7/30/20, https://www.eurasiareview.com/30072020-globalization-of-capitalist-crises-oped/

The post pandemic economic recovery looks uncertain and the economic growth projections look gloomy in every stretch of policy paradigm within capitalist imaginations. The strong and existing multilateral cooperation within the Westphalian international system is falling apart and facing its existential threats due to its entrenched Eurocentric bias, democratic deficits and institutional dominance by the erstwhile colonial powers. The world is moving into a long-term crisis within capitalism. The capitalist system has failed to offer any viable alternatives to recover from the crises. It is rather deepening the globalisation of crises and miseries among the masses. The predicaments of hunger, homelessness and unemployment are growing. The idea of accessibility, availability and distribution of essential goods and services are becoming difficult. The markets are shrinking and sinking. Both the producers and consumers are facing the crises in their everyday lives.

The follies of globalisation and its flickers continue to be in denial mode. These illiberal charlatans of power live in the cocoons of their privileged ghettos and argue vehemently that the current crisis is not a capitalist crisis or crisis of globalisation. There is concocted propaganda that the crisis is a product of greedy and irrational individuals, inefficient governments and unproductive states. The free market led systems are only viable and competent alternatives. These reactionary and ahistorical narratives help capitalism by arguing that the current economic, social, political, environmental and Coronavirus led global health crises are products of state and government failures.

The right-wing economists, liberal commentators, salary seeking intellectuals and consultants in different thinktanks continue to glorify and provide ideological justification to capitalist globalisation by hiding its absolute failures in deepening egalitarian democracy, peace and prosperity.

The globalisation of crises under capitalism serves four objectives of the ruling and non-ruling classes. Firstly, these ridiculous propaganda makes people reject the state and government they have formed with the help of their collective will. Secondly, it diminishes citizens faith in their own abilities and own intellect. It weakens and diverts them to analyse and reflect on their own realities. Thirdly, it weakens the state and destroys the capabilities of the governments as instruments of social, economic, political and cultural change for common good based on scientific spirit and progressive future. Finally, it destroys democratic cultures by replacing it with authoritarianism that is concomitant with the requirements of capitalism for its growth. In this way, the fake narratives of reactionary politics and global capitalism helps to achieve these four specific objectives, which are central pillars in establishing authoritarianism accelerated by crises. The globalisation of capitalist crises means globalisation of authoritarian politics and vice versa.

## T---Per Se

### 2AC---T---Per Se

#### ‘Antitrust law’ and ‘prohibitions’ both include the Rule of Reason.

Light ’19 [Sarah; 2019; Legal Studies Professor in the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, Stanford Law Review, “The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law,” vol. 71]

While antitrust law can serve as an environmental mandate by prohibiting collusive behavior that keeps environmentally preferable goods from the market, there is also conflict between antitrust law’s goals of promoting competition and environmental law’s goals of promoting conservation.192 Because antitrust law's per se rule and rule of reason operate on a somewhat fluid continuum, 193 this Subpart discusses the two doctrines together. The per se rule operates as a prohibition, whereas the rule of reason operates as both a prohibition and a disincentive.

As noted above, antitrust law generally prohibits certain types of market activity - price fixing, horizontal boycotts, and output limitations - as illegal per se, and harm to competition is presumed. 194 For example, if an industry association declines to award a seal of approval necessary for a product's sale without any good faith attempt to test the product's performance, but rather simply because that product is manufactured by a competitor, such an action would be illegal per se. 195 Under this Article's framework, a per se violation is thus a prohibition.

The more fact-intensive inquiry under the rule of reason tests "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." 196 While this extremely broad statement might suggest that any fact is relevant to the inquiry, the salient facts under the rule of reason are "those that tend to establish whether a restraint increases or decreases output, or decreases or increases prices." 197 If an anticompetitive effect is found, then the action is illegal and the rule of reason operates, like the per se rule, as a prohibition. 198 The rule of reason can also operate as a disincentive, even if no court finds an anticompetitive effect, as uncertainty and litigation risk may discourage firms from undertaking legally permissible, environmentally positive industry collaborations. 199

## CP---Anti-Competitive PIC

### 2AC---CP---Process

#### Debates over managerial details normalize the social relations from which policies emerge, even if they claim to agree with the affirmative’s strategy

Bhattacharyya 13 Race and Ethnicity Prof at Aston University (Gargi, How can we live with ourselves? Universities and the attempt to reconcile learning and doing, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 36, No. 9, 1411-1428)

In Britain also there has been a move away from radical imagination in the politics of race, towards either highly institutionalized activity designed to measure and correct differential outcomes, or to ethnic particularity that challenges racism faced by a particular group but rarely links this activity to other struggles or a vision of an alternative society. However necessary these forms of organization may be because institutional outcomes continue to harden inequality between groups and mobilization needs to take place where people are, building on the affiliations that make sense to them the loss of a larger vision and set of aspirations diminishes what anti-racist politics can be. Kelly (2002, p. xii) goes on to specify the loss that arises from too exclusive a focus on matters of institutional detail or immediate politicking: Without new visions we don’t know what to build, only what to knock down. We not only end up confused, rudderless, and cynical, but we forget that making a revolution is not a series of clever maneuvers and tactics but a process that can and must transform us. This new revolutionary subject is unlikely to emerge from the mundane techniques of management that have come to typify ‘useful’ research in the field of racism. In response to the formulation of recent research funding in the UK, research in the field of race and racism that connects with ‘users’ has tended towards the technical. Much of this is shaped by the demand that research demonstrate its own ‘impact’, that is, shows its usefulness to an audience beyond academia, often before any findings are made and in order for time and money to be allocated.6 For the field of race and ethnic studies, this demand brings a model of knowledge as technique often management technique. Whether racism is seen to arise from communicational barriers between groups or from flawed institutional practices, the solution is presented as alternative practices do this and others will adapt their behaviour in these ways. If this were the extent of the imaginative failure, things would not be too bad. After all, universities rarely include the most exciting of ideas until the excitement can be rewritten as tradition. Sometimes banishment from the academy can help to get a different and more energetic audience for ideas that aspire to change our world. However, the politics of race seems to be institutionalized in an even more tightly confined logic in the spaces outside the academy. There may be a widespread recognition that racism demands an institutional response, but this is ripped away from any larger political narrative altogether. As a result, the attempts by scholars to address a public also tend to be limited by the narrow demands of such technical or legalistic approaches to what anti-racism can and should be. There is a dilemma here. For scholars who wish to connect with so called practitioners and who, perhaps, consider this world of equalities practice as their ‘public’ research is likely to become focused around these questions of technical organization. Of course, many of us still seek to document and explore the complexity of racism and its impact in the world but the focus for this endeavour becomes segmented by institutional focus and, often, a rush to make ‘recommendations’. Access to research funding in Britain, increasingly the only route to creating space for scholarly work, demands that research delivers this ‘impact’ of immediate and usable advice. At the same time, the ‘public’ of practitioners a group here that is overwhelmingly concentrated in organizations tasked with delivering services to diverse populations, whether through statutory services or the third sector appear to understand the role of the intellectual only as this kind of technical adviser.7 Useful research becomes only this research that can enable alternative and potentially more effective operation of bureaucratic practices of one kind or another. This framing of anti-racist research transforms the kind of politics that can be imagined for this intellectual endeavour. This is anti-racism as a matter of organizational adaptation, not any wider social transformation. Perhaps some believe that transformation occurs through the collective impact of these many small organizational changes that has certainly been the unspoken implication of anti- racist work since the Lawrence Enquiry but, whatever the benefits of improved institutional practices, if these in fact have been achieved, this approach abandons any sense of political movement. We may be producing work that connects with a public, but the aspirations of both scholars and public seem less than they were.

#### Market relations generate extreme inequality, its structural---only socialism can solve

Cockshott and Zachariah 12 \*computer scientist, economist, and professor at the University of Glasgow \*\*researcher in political economy (Paul and David, <http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~wpc/reports/ArgumentsforSocialism/argumentsasreleased.pdf>, emuse)  
What was not obvious was what this implies. Yakovenko showed that the laws of thermodynamics then imply that the distribution of money between people will follow the same form as the distribution of energy between molecules in a gas : the so called Gibbs-Boltzmann distribution. This sounds very scientific, but what does it actually mean? What the Gibbs-Boltzmann distribution of money says is that a few people with end up with a lot of money and a lot of people with end up with very little money. It says that the distribution of money will be very uneven, just as we see in capitalist society. In fact Yakovenko showed that the distribution of wealth in the USA fits the Gibbs-Boltzman distribution pretty closely. There is a tendancy to think that rich people owe their wealth to intelligence or effort, but physics tells us no. Given a market economy, then the laws of chance mean that a lot of money will end up in the hands of a few people. In fact when we look at the USA we find that the distribution of wealth is even more uneven than we would expect from the Gibbs-Boltzmann law. If the Gibbs Boltzman law held, there would be millionaires but no billionaires. Why the disparity? Yakovenkos original equations represented an economy that is rather like what Marx called simple commodity production. It assumed only buying and selling. More recent work by Yakovenko and Wright [drag- ulescu02a, wright2005sac], has shown that if you modify these equations to allow either the earning of interest on money, or the hiring of wage labour, then the equations predict a polarisation of the population into two groups. The great bulk of the population, the working class and petty bourgeois, follow a Gibbs-Boltzmann income distribution. But there is a second class, those whose income derives from capital, whose wealth will follow a different law, what is called a power-law. Again, look in detail at the distribution of wealth and you provide exactly the distribution predicted by Yakovenko’s theory. This, says Yakovenko, proves that Marx was right when he said that modern society was comprised of two distinct and opposed classes : capitalists and workers. What conclusions can we draw from this with respect to market socialism? The first point is that as soon as you have a set of private agents, be they individuals, firms or cooperatives engaging in monetary trade, the laws of thermodynamics mean that the maximal entropy (most probable) distribution of money between the agents will be very uneven. Since, as Adam Smith said, money is the power too command the labour of others, this uneven distribution of money translates into an uneven distribution of social power. Those agents with more money are in a position to hire other agents under contractual terms favourable to the hirers. As soon as this happens the process of differentiation of income accelerates, and you move from the Gibbs Boltzman to the even more unequal power-law distribution of income characteristic of capitalist society. This is a prediction that arises from simulation models of economies, but if we look at a real examples of a socialist economy taking the market socialist path – China under Deng, we see in reality the sort of income inequalities the models predict. It may be argued that in China the introduction of market relations went much further than is advocated by some market socialists. That may well be true, but this sort of process acquires its own dynamic: My own work, inspired by the reform experience, contributed additional arguments for refuting the Lange-theory. It seems to be highly improbable to generate the strong cost-minimizing or profit-maximizing incentive, taken as granted in the world of Lange’s theory, in a public firm under a soft budget constraint regime. It is impossible to couple an arbitrarily chosen ownership structure and an also arbitrarily chosen set of coordination mechanisms. There is close affinity between certain owner- ship forms and certain coordination mechanisms. Decentralized market and private ownership belong together. A further important counter-argument comes from the political and ideological sphere. The smooth functioning of the market depends on the “climate”. It requires a market-friendly environment. If the politicians ruling a country are sworn enemies of genuine decentralization, the market will be banned to the black and grey area of the economy and cannot become the fundamental coordinator and integrator.) [kornai,200] The converse of this is that if we want to stop a highly unequal distribution of income, we either have to remove the mechanism that generates it, or do work to reduce the entropy of the system. Marx’s proposal for abolishing money and instituting labour accounts which do not circulate, do not function as money, removes the underlying random process which generates inequality. The Swedish model works to reduce entropy through redistributive taxes. It has to constantly work against the tendancy of the market economy to generate a high degree of inequality, and can at most partially mitigate this inequality.

#### Economic decline decreases the incidence of war

Clary 15 – Christopher Clary, PhD in Political Science from MIT, M.A. in National Security Affairs, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2015 (“Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 25th, Available Online via SSRN Subscription, AIvackovic)

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict?

Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 19i9 50, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.

Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.

#### Growth increases the size and duration of conflicts

Laio 19 – Jianan Liao, Shenzhen Nanshan Foreign Language School. [Business Cycle and War: A Literature Review and Evaluation, Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, Volume 68, International Symposium on Social Science and Management Innovation, https://download.atlantis-press.com/article/55913122.pdf]//BPS

Second, the economic origin for the outbreak of war is downward pressure on the economy rather than optimism or competition for monopoly capital, which may exist during economic recession or economic prosperity. This is due to a fact that during economic prosperity, people are also worried about a potential economic recession. Blainey pointed out that **wars** often occur in the economic upturn, which is caused by the optimism in people's mind [14], that is, the confidence to prevail. This interpretation linking optimism and war ignores the strength contrast between the warring parties. Not all wars are equally comprehensive, and there have always been wars of unequal strength. In such a war, one of the parties tends to have an absolute advantage, so the expectation of the outcome of the war is not directly related to the economic situation of the country. Optimism is not a major factor leading to war, but may somewhat serve as stimulation. In addition, Lenin attributed the war to competition between monopoly capital. This theory may seem plausible, but its scope of application is obviously too narrow. Lenin's theory of imperialism is only applicable to developed capitalist countries in the late stage of the development capitalism, but in reality, many wars take place among developing countries whose economies are still at their beginning stages. Therefore, the theory centered on competition among monopoly capital cannot explain most foreign wars. Moreover, even wars that occur during periods of economic expansion are likely to result from the potential expectation of economic recession, the "limits of growth" [15] faced during prosperity -- a potential deficiency of market demand. So the downward pressure on the economy is the cause of war.

Third, the business cycle may be related with the intensity, instead of the outbreak, of the war. Scholars who supported the first two views did not pay attention to the underlying relationship between business cycle and the intensity of war. Some scholars, such as Nikolai Kondratieff and Joshua Goldstein, believes that the business cycle is not directly related to the outbreak of war, but the outbreak of war during the economic upswing appears to be more intense and persistent. In their analysis of the business cycle and war, Kondratieff and Goldstein discovered that the most dramatic and deadly wars occurred during periods of economic upswing. This finding may provide some clues on the relationship between war and the business cycle. Although the relationship between the outbreak of war and the business cycle is unclear, the scale of the war is likely to be influenced by the exact phase of the business cycle in which the belligerents are engaged. Such a phenomenon might make sense, since countries in economic upturn have better fiscal capacity, making them more likely to wage large-scale wars. Moreover, such relationship may also stem from the optimism pointed out by Blainey. While optimism may not directly lead to wars, it may have an impact on the choice of rivals. This is because optimism about national strength and the outcome of the war may drive countries to choose stronger rivals. The resulting war is likely to be far more massive and bloody. Nevertheless, more research is needed to specifically reveal this relationship.

From this point of view, it is not clear whether there is a direct causal relationship between the outbreak of war and the business cycle, but the existence of periodic economic crises in capitalist countries renders war a tool to promote expansionary economic policies. The economic performance of the war is the expansion of government expenditure and possession of overseas resources and markets, which is in some ways consistent with the goal of expansionary fiscal policy. Therefore, war may be used by governments as a political means to stimulate the economy, although the relationship between the use of such means and the specific stages of business cycle remains to be explored.

## CP---Antitrust PIC

### 2AC---CP---Antitrust PIC

#### Passing the plan requires expanding core antitrust law---a slew of other exemptions also need to be removed

Elhauge ’17 [Einer; December 6; Law Professor at Harvard University; United States Antitrust Law and Economics, “Introduction: An Overview of Antitrust Laws and Remedial Structure,” p. 42-43]

b. EXPLICIT EXEMPTIONS OR LIMITATIONS. Congress has also frequently enacted explicit exemptions or alterations of antitrust standards. These include exemptions that:

1. Allow those who farm or fish to form cooperatives without those cooperatives being considered agreements in restraint of trade, although the Secretary of Agriculture has authority to enjoin cooperatives that unduly enhance prices. This exemption does not extend to agreements with nonexempt persons, nor to exclusionary conduct by cooperatives against rivals or other nonmembers.

2. Exempt certain mergers and television agreements by sports leagues. Baseball also enjoys a special judicially- created antitrust exemption, other than for conduct that affects the employment of ballplayers, which is instead governed by the labor exemption described below.

3. Immunize charitable gift annuities or charitable remainder trusts.

4. Exempt the medical resident matching program.

5. Provide more generous antitrust standards for mergers and agreements between newspapers when one is a failing firm.183

6. Exempt professional review bodies from antitrust damages for actions that are based on the quality of a physician's care and may adversely affect the physician's hospital privileges or society memberships, provided the actions were based on a reasonable belief that they would enhance the quality of health care and were made after reasonable investigation and process.

7. Exempt collective rate making that is known and approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission.185

8. Exempt shipper conduct that is already prohibited by the Shipping Act of 1984. «

9. Exempt agreements that the President finds vital to national defense.

10. Exempt joint research and development that has been approved by the Small Business Administration.

11. Provide more generous antitrust standards for judging bank mergers.

All of these exemptions require examination of the detailed statutory requirements. Two other exemptions require a bit more discussion because of their importance and doctrinal development.

## CP---States

## DA---FTC Tradeoff

### 2AC---DA---FTC Tradeoff

#### No AI agreements from the FTC.

Stokes ’21 [Jon; April 20; CPU Editor Emeritus and a co-founder of Ars Technica; Jon Stokes, “No, the FTC is not about to wade into the AI bias wars,” https://www.jonstokes.com/p/no-the-ftc-is-not-about-to-wade-into]

So the jig is up, right? Companies are about to start getting hauled into court and eating big fines over things like face recognition software that doesn’t work well on black faces or healthcare algorithms that reinforce racial disparities in care? No, no such thing is likely to happen. Here’s the short version of why:

* The FTC can indeed probably regulate a lot of the AI issues it mentions in this post, at least theoretically. It can also block mega-mergers, cut monopolies down to size, and do a whole bunch of other stuff that it hasn’t actually done for decades.
* The FTC is understaffed and underfunded, and for 20 years has had no real political will to even carry out its core trust-busting mission. So the idea that this atrophied agency will suddenly wade into the fraught, murky waters of the fast-moving AI algo wars and bust some heads... it just seems really unlikely.
* We don’t have basic standards, benchmarks, and measurement tools for evaluating AI/ML systems for “bias,” nor do we even have agreed-upon notions of “fairness” to work with in most of the applicable areas.

The blog post itself is confused in some important ways, particularly around transparency and auditing.

On the point that some of the issues covered in the post do fall under the FTC’s purview, see, How Artificial Intelligence Can Comply with the Federal Trade Commission Act, which was recommended to me by a source who follows this area of law.

* There is general agreement that the authority of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the “Act”) is broad enough to govern algorithmic decision-making and other forms of artificial intelligence (“AI”).[1] Section 5(a) the Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” as unlawful.[2] The Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”) is authorized to challenge such acts or practices through administrative adjudication and to promulgate regulations to address unfair or deceptive practices that occur widely by multiple parties in the market.[3]
* The FTC has a department that focuses on algorithmic transparency, the Office of Technology Research and Investigation, and has requested public comment on and scheduled hearings about algorithmic decision-making and AI.[4]
* The article goes on to give advice about complying with the FTC Act, but take-home here is that the agency has a pretty broad purview in this area, especially around the issues of advertising claims and credit availability that the blog post focuses on.

As for whether the agency will actually jump in and do a bunch of rule-making in this area, this seems pretty unlikely. I corresponded with one lawyer who didn’t wish to be named and who practices in the area of consumer product regulation, and he pointed me to a number of resources on this topic.

He also said, “Most federal regulatory bodies are so badly underfunded that overzealous enforcement on novel areas of law is not particularly likely,” and suggested that this blog post is extremely unlikely to be a prelude to a string of AI-related enforcement actions.

#### There’s a typhoon of antitrust expansion in all domains---2022 is a watershed.

Swartz ’1-1 [Jon; updated January 1; reporter, citing Bhaskar Chakravorti, dean of global business at the Fletcher School at Tufts University; MarketWatch, “Big Tech heads for ‘a year of thousands of tiny tech papercuts,’ but what antitrust efforts could make them bleed?” <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/big-tech-heads-for-a-year-of-thousands-of-tiny-tech-papercuts-but-what-antitrust-efforts-could-make-them-bleed-11640640776>]

This could finally change in 2022 as it did in the late 1990s, when some tech companies struck a cautious stance during the Justice Department’s investigation of Microsoft for monopolistic practices, Syed said.

“The difference is that we’re talking about interconnected companies that own an industry versus just one company [with Microsoft],” she said. “And there is bipartisan support, which makes it easier politically.”

With more than a dozen pieces of anti-tech legislation, a plethora of lawsuits and regulatory fines escalating in the U.S. and abroad, as well as the Biden administration rounding out Big Tech’s nightmare team of government agency heads, 2022 is shaping up as a seminal year for tech regulation after decades of inaction.

In rapid succession this year, Biden named and nominated an antitrust team of Tim Wu (to the newly created position of head of competition policy at the National Economic Council), Lina Khan (chair of the Federal Trade Commission) and Jonathan Kanter (head of the antitrust division of the Justice Department). Each is a heralded anti-monopolist advocate who has written extensively on the topic or represented companies making antitrust claims against Big Tech.

The trio have been referred to as members of a “New Brandeis movement,” named after Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, whose decisions limited the power of big business in the early 20th century. With the New Brandeis trifecta in place, and Congress evaluating more than dozen possible anti-tech bills, next year is “shaping up to be the year of Tech Takedown,” Bhaskar Chakravorti, dean of global business at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, told MarketWatch.

More troubling for tech CEOs, he said, are the “many tiny actions at the FTC, Justice Department and Congress that will continue to keep feeding the news cycles with a steady stream of actions” that add up to a “a year of thousands of tiny tech papercuts.”

Big Tech’s treacherous path to antitrust enforcement has three potentially damaging roads: federal agencies challenging acquisitions and mergers; legislation tailored to stimulate competition and curtail the influence of tech’s dominant platforms; and federal and state lawsuits.

Closer scrutiny of M&A activity

The biggest immediate impact from the Biden administration’s all-out assault could be a cooling-off period of frenzied mergers and acquisitions by the biggest players. Regulators have been empowered with examining past deals and more strenuously inspecting tech’s latest purchases.

Major movement is already happening on the M&A front because, as lawyers and executives told MarketWatch, the FTC and Justice Department have new leadership empowered to more closely review and approve mergers while they await legislation and court actions. A non-binding [presidential executive order largely seen as aimed at Big Tech](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/07/09/fact-sheet-executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/) announced a policy of greater scrutiny of mergers over the summer, and the FTC and Justice Department each would receive $500 million in new funding to boost staff working on antitrust enforcement as part of the House-passed reconciliation bill awaiting Senate action.

The FTC is signaling greater oversight over deals, requiring affirmative consent on certain transactions, which may prolong uncertainty on merger agreements. The agency has already sued to block the largest semiconductor deal ever — Nvidia Corp.’s [NVDA, 3.05%](https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/NVDA?mod=MW_story_quote) proposed $40 billion acquisition of U.K.-based chip-design provider Arm Ltd., saying the deal would “distort Arm’s incentives in chip markets and allow the combined firm to unfairly undermine Nvidia’s rivals.”

Another FTC antitrust probe, into Meta’s plan to acquire VR fitness app Supernatural for $400 million, is underway, according to a [report](https://www.theinformation.com/articles/ftc-slows-meta-platforms-metaverse-strategy-by-extending-antitrust-probe-of-vr-deal?utm_source=ti_app)by The Information.

The Justice Department’s direction is less clear at this point, but signals from Kanter’s confirmation hearing point to “vigorous enforcement” of antitrust laws.

“Personnel is policy. With the trifecta of Khan, Kanter and Wu, there is a new sheriff in town,” Luther Lowe, senior vice president of public policy at Yelp Inc. [YELP, 2.73%](https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/YELP?mod=MW_story_quote), told MarketWatch. “Efforts by Amazon and Facebook to recuse Khan, and Google’s attempt to recuse Kanter, is like arsonists asking for firefighters to be removed from a fire.”

An overwhelming swath of Americans, regardless of political affiliation, believe Big Tech wields too much power and should be held in check on acquisitions, according to a survey of 1,187 likely voters by Data for Progress in September. Wide majorities believe Big Tech “puts competitors at a disadvantage” (69%) and “shouldn’t be able to buy up smaller businesses because of the potential negative impacts on competition and consumers” (66%).

Agencies are more aggressively scrutinizing tech-related deals, antitrust attorney Valarie Williams told MarketWatch. Whether investigations block mergers, they “can be disruptive and stop mergers if not discourage them,” she said.

“Legislation or not, that will not affect at all DoJ and FTC in antitrust enforcement based on existing law,” Williams said. “The pendulum has definitely swung after years of inactivity and readily-approved mergers.”

At the very least, expect acquisitions to take longer to complete, if they can get through the regulatory process at all. And expect more scrutiny over smaller deals after [an FTC study](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/09/ftc-report-on-unreported-acquisitions-by-biggest-tech-companies) in September revealed that Amazon, Apple, Google, Meta and Microsoft made 616 acquisitions from 2010 to 2019 that fell below the FTC’s $92 million reporting threshold but were worth at least $1 million.

“Investors have told us that they have built more time into deals being done, but still expect many to go through,” Ed Mills, Washington policy analyst at Raymond James, told MarketWatch. “They are ready for a longer process and agencies to be skeptical of acquisitions of nascent competitors by larger players.”

Deep-pocketed investors in startups hoping to be acquired have noticed. Bettina Hein, co-founder and chief executive of digital-healthcare startup Juli, put it in stark terms during the Dec. 15 Senate hearing on competition: 10 times as many tech startups seek acquisitions as they do an initial public offering.

Increasingly, executives and investors have reached out to antitrust law firms to assess the legislative and political climate and its impact on Big Tech’s aggressive M&A strategy, according to Nabiha Syed, president of The Markup.

“Boards with exit strategies are huddling with antitrust lawyers to see if this lasts the next two years,” she said. “A key question is how soon the FTC shakes things up. To me, they speed up the war drums and hit the ground running in 2022. There is a public appetite and more momentum this time than around” than when the Justice Department sued Microsoft in the 1990s, she added.

Legislation is on the way, but how soon?

As U.S. regulators prepare to crack down, legislators are ramping up bills for votes, the culmination of years of hearings and policy discussions.

“This is a watershed moment for Big Tech accountability, and 2022 will be the year that these companies finally face the regulation that will end their harmful and deceptive practices,” Sen. Edward Markey, D-Mass., told MarketWatch. Markey, author of the landmark Child Online Protection Act of 1998, has toiled on a sequel for years and is confident it will happen in 2022.

Next year could shape up as the biggest for tech legislation since Bill Clinton’s presidency, when the Telecommunications Act of 1996 significantly amended the Communications Act of 1934, according to Jim Steyer, CEO of Common Sense Media, a lobbying and advocacy organization, and co-chair of the Future of Tech Commission, appointed by White House in April.

Steyer anticipates changes to privacy law, with a federal law modeled after California’s CCPA in 2018, and platform accountability in the form of revisions to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Most important, the $1 billion in funding for FTC and Justice as part of the evolving Build Back Better bill would give regulators the ability to enforce.

“Laws without enforcement are like sharks without teeth,” he told MarketWatch.

Facebook whistle-blower [Frances Haugen’s](https://www.marketwatch.com/story/meta-faces-another-day-of-reckoning-on-capitol-hill-as-facebook-whistleblower-frances-haugen-testifies-11638378756?mod=article_inline) impact “energized Congress on bipartisan bills” while Biden’s executive order “sent a clear message” that acquisitions won’t occur at the same pace. “The federal government, in the form of the FTC and Justice, will take longer looks at potential combinations” like Nvidia and Arm, Steyer said.

The House has introduced six bills, the Senate has at least three major pieces of legislation, and more are expected. Rep. David Cicilline, D-R.I., a key architect of the House’s six bills, has said he expects “we’ll be in a position to bring the bills to the floor” by the fall.

Big Tech has attempted to throw money at the problem. Amazon ($15.33 million), Facebook ($14.65 million) and Alphabet ($8.95 million) ranked among the top 20 spenders in lobbying efforts on government policy this year, [according to the nonprofit OpenSecrets](https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/top-spenders), even as the debate over antitrust efforts took down a major Silicon Valley lobbying group.

And midterm elections could change the course of Democrats’ legislation. House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., in June signaled his opposition to giving regulators too much authority and that House Republicans plan to target other tech issues, namely around “free speech [Section 230] and free enterprise.”

Federal and state lawsuits

The Justice Department is rumored to be on the cusp of two major lawsuits: one targeting Google’s dominance of the digital advertising market, the other aimed at Apple, perhaps at the influence and business practices of its App Store though it remains unclear.

Justice’s next lawsuit against Google would be its second antitrust action. The first, in July, alleged Google illegally protected its monopoly over online search advertising. Separately, a group of 36 states and the District of Columbia sued Google in July, claiming its mobile app store abuses its market power and forces aggressive terms on software developers.

Perhaps the most intriguing of a handful of state-led cases against Google is one led by Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton. It claims Google commands a cut of 22% to 42% of U.S. ad spending that goes through its systems, according to [a newly unredacted lawsuit](https://www.wsj.com/articles/attorneys-general-launch-probe-of-google-11568055853?mod=article_inline&mod=article_inline).

Apple’s quandary is the ongoing Epic Games Inc. antitrust suit that is wending its way through appeals court. Though a federal judge ruled Apple did not break antitrust law, she issued an injunction that would have forced Apple to allow external payment options on its App Store by Dec. 9. [[Apple recently won a stay](https://www.marketwatch.com/story/apple-wins-appeal-in-epic-case-avoiding-changes-to-app-store-on-dec-9-2021-12-08?mod=article_inline) on appeal of the injunction. The stay, however, does not reverse the earlier ruling but puts enforcement on hold until the appeals court can fully hear the case, a process that will likely take months.]

Meanwhile, the FTC continues to plow ahead on its lawsuit to force the divesture of Instagram and WhatsApp from Meta. At the very least, the lawsuit sets a template for the agency’s avowed crack down on tech M&A action, regardless of the decision in the case.

This leaves Amazon, which could be bracing for an FTC suit led by its longtime nemesis Khan. The agency is currently probing Amazon as part of a series of ongoing investigations into Big Tech, and it is looking more closely at Amazon’s planned $8.45 billion purchase of MGM Studios.

#### FTC overload now.

Burke ’21 [Henry and Andrea; May 28; B.A. in Political Science and Labor Studies from the University of California at Los Angeles; Research Assistant, B.A. in Economics from the University of Maryland; Revolving Door Project, “Hobbled FTC Lacks Budget to Combat Corporate Buying Spree,” <https://therevolvingdoorproject.org/hobbled-ftc-lacks-budget-to-combat-corporate-buying-spree/>]

Even if the will to stop it exists, the FTC doesn’t have the funding to stop this boom. In fact, it hasn’t had the funding to keep up with a steady uptick in mergers in years. Aside from the recent spike, the total number of premerger filings [increased](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-competition-department-justice-antitrust-division-hart-scott-rodino/p110014hsrannualreportfy2019_0.pdf) by 80 percent over the last 10 years. In 2010, corporations filed 1166 premerger notifications. By 2019, yearly filings almost doubled to 2089.

While the number of transactions the FTC is charged with regulating has increased steadily, the number of enforcement actions — challenges to anticompetitive mergers or conduct — has stagnated.  A 2020 paper from Equitable Growth showed that while the number of [enforcement actions](https://equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/111920-antitrust-report.pdf) from both the FTC and DOJ hovered at about 40 challenges per year from 2010 to 2019, even as the number of corporations seeking merger approval grew. The FTC’s enforcement actions over the past ten years show the agency hasn’t kept up with increased HSR filings: while FY 2010 saw 22 enforcement actions for 1166 reported mergers, a ratio of approximately one enforcement action for every 53 mergers, FY 2019 saw a mere 21 enforcement actions for 2089 mergers, meaning there was only one FTC enforcement action for every 99 mergers.

Overall funding and staffing levels at the FTC have similarly stagnated. Then-FTC commissioner Rebecca Slaughter said in 2020 that it is an “[indisputable](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1583714/slaughter_remarks_at_gcr_interactive_women_in_antitrust.pdf)” fact that FTC funding has not kept up with market demands; according to Slaughter, the FTC budget has only increased by 13% since 2010 and the employee headcount decreased. This budget increase has not come from increased discretionary appropriations from Congress however, but from a massive increase in merger filings and their accompanying fees. Startlingly, Slaughter notes that “the FTC had roughly 50% more full-time employees at the beginning of the Reagan Administration than it does today.” The situation has become so dire that increased budgets for the enforcement agencies has become a rare [bipartisan](https://www.law360.com/articles/1368496/klobuchar-says-congress-has-rare-shot-at-antitrust-overhaul) issue in the Senate.

#### FTC is structurally incapable of being an effective regulator

Lande and Davis ‘17 [Robert; Joshua; 2017; Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, and a Director of the American Antitrust Institute; Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship, Professor of Law, and Director, Center for Law and Ethics, University of San Francisco School of Law, and member of the Advisory Board of the American Antitrust Institute; A Report to the 45th President of the United States; “Restoring the Legitimacy of Private Enforcement,” ch. 6]

As has been observed, “government cannot be expected to do all or even most of the necessary enforcement” for numerous reasons – in addition to budgetary constraints – including “undue fear of losing cases; lack of awareness of industry conditions; overly suspicious views about complaints by ‘losers’ that they were in fact victims of anticompetitive behavior; higher turnover among government attorneys; and the unfortunate, but undeniable, reality that government enforcement (or nonenforcement) decisions are, at times, politically motivated.”7

#### Governmental AI development makes bad AI inevitable

Brian Tomasik 13 {Tech advisor for the Foundational Research Institute. 12-5-2013. “International Cooperation vs. AI Arms Race.” https://foundational-research.org/international-cooperation-vs-ai-arms-race/#AI\_arms\_races}//JM

AI arms races Government AI development could go wrong in several ways. Plausibly governments would botch the process by not realizing the risks at hand. It's also possible that governments would use the AI and robots for totalitarian purposes. It seems that both of these bad scenarios would be exacerbated by international conflict. Greater hostility means countries are more inclined to use AI as a weapon. Indeed, whoever builds the first AI can take over the world, which makes building AI the ultimate arms race. A USA-China race is one reasonable possibility. Arms races encourage risk-taking -- being willing to skimp on safety measures to improve your odds of winning ("Racing to the Precipice"). In addition, the weaponization of AI could lead to worse expected outcomes in general. CEV seems to have less hope of success in a Cold War scenario. ("What? You want to include the evil Chinese in your CEV??") With a pure CEV, presumably it would eventually count Chinese values even if it started with just Americans, because people would become more enlightened during the process. However, when we imagine more crude democratic decision outcomes, this becomes less likely. In Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Ch. 14), Nick Bostrom proposes that another reason AI arms races would crimp AI safety is that competing teams wouldn't be able to share insights about AI control. What Bostrom doesn't mention is that competing teams also wouldn't share insights about AI capability. So even if less inter-team information sharing reduces safety, it also reduces speed, and the net effect isn't clear to me. Of course, there are situations where arms-race dynamics can be desirable. In the original prisoner's dilemma, the police benefit if the prisoners defect. Defection on a tragedy of the commons by companies is the heart of perfect competition's efficiency. It also underlies competition among countries to improve quality of life for citizens. Arms races generally speed up innovation, which can be good if the innovation being produced is both salutary and not risky. This is not the case for general AI. Nor is it the case for other "races to the bottom".

## K---Cap

### 2AC---K---Cap

#### Perm do both---the neg must prove the alternative is functionally competitive---anything else amplifies capitalist splintering tactics and dooms inter-movement cooperation necessary to displace capitalism

Parr ’13 (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, *THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics*, pp. 5-6)

The contradiction of capitalism is that it is an uncompromising structure of negotiation. It ruthlessly absorbs sociohistorical limits and the challenges these limits pose to capital, placing them in the service of further capital accumulation. Neoliberalism is an exclusive system premised upon the logic of property rights and the expansion of these rights, all the while maintaining that the free market is self-regulating, sufficiently and efficiently working to establish individual and collective well-being. In reality, however, socioeconomic disparities have become more acute the world over, and the world's "common wealth,” as David Bollier and later Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri note, has been increasingly privatized.12 In 2010, the financial wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals (with investable assets of $1 to $50 million or more [all money amounts are in U.S. dollars] ) surpassed the 2007 pre-financial crisis peak, growing 9.7 percent and reaching $42.7 trillion. Also in 2010 the global population of high-net­ worth individuals grew 8.3 percent to 10.9 million.13 In 2010, the global population was 6.9 billion, of whom there were 1,000 billionaires; 80,000 ultra-high-net-worth individuals with average wealth exceeding $50 mil­ lion; 3 billion with an average wealth of $10,000, of which 1.1 billion owned less than $1,000; and 2.5 billion who were reportedly "unbanked'' (without a bank account and thus living on the margins of the formal financial system) .14 In a world where financial advantage brings with it political benefits, these figures attest to the weak position the majority of the world occupies in the arena of environmental and climate change politics. Neoliberal capitalism ameliorates the threat posed by environmental change by taking control of the collective call it issues forth, splintering the collective into a disparate and confusing array of individual choices competing with one another over how best to solve the crisis. Through this process of competition, the collective nature of the crisis is restructured and privatized, then put to work for the production and circulation of capital as the average wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals grows at the expense of the majority of the world living in abject poverty. Advocating that the free market can solve debilitating environmental changes and the climate crisis is not a political response to these problems; it is merely a political ghost emptied of its collective aspirations.

## K---Liberalism

### 2AC---K---Liberalism

#### Settler tech development makes extinction inevitable - attempts at regulation fail

Bruce **Sterling**, 6-1-20**18**, "When Nick Bostrom says “Bang”," WIRED, <https://www.wired.com/beyond-the-beyond/2018/06/nick-bostrom-says-bang/>

4.1 Deliberate **misuse of nanotechnology** In a mature form, molecular nanotechnology will enable the construction of bacterium-scale self-replicating mechanical robots that can feed on dirt or other organic matter [22-25]. Such replicators could **eat up the biosphere** or destroy it by other means such as by poisoning it, burning it, or blocking out sunlight. A person of malicious intent in possession of this technology might cause the extinction of intelligent life on Earth by releasing such nanobots into the environment.[9] The technology to produce a destructive nanobot seems considerably easier to develop than the technology to create an effective defense against such an attack (a global nanotech immune system, an “active shield” [23]). It is therefore likely that there will be a period of vulnerability during which this technology must be prevented from coming into the wrong hands. Yet the technology could prove hard to regulate, since it doesn’t require rare radioactive isotopes or large, easily identifiable manufacturing plants, as does production of nuclear weapons [23]. Even if effective defenses against a limited nanotech attack are developed before dangerous replicators are designed and acquired by suicidal regimes or terrorists, there will still be the danger of an arms race between states possessing nanotechnology. It has been argued [26] that molecular manufacturing would lead to both arms race instability and crisis instability, to a higher degree than was the case with nuclear weapons. Arms race instability means that there would be dominant incentives for each competitor to escalate its armaments, leading to a runaway arms race. Crisis instability means that there would be dominant incentives for striking first. Two roughly balanced rivals acquiring nanotechnology would, on this view, begin a massive buildup of armaments and weapons development programs that would continue until a crisis occurs and war breaks out, potentially causing global terminal destruction. That the arms race could have been predicted is no guarantee that an international security system will be created ahead of time to prevent this disaster from happening. The nuclear arms race between the US and the USSR was predicted but occurred nevertheless. 4.2 Nuclear holocaust[winter] The US and Russia still have huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons. But would an all-out nuclear war really exterminate humankind? Note that: (i) For there to be an existential risk it suffices that we can’t be sure that it wouldn’t. (ii) The climatic effects of a large nuclear war are not well known (there is the possibility of a nuclear winter). (iii) Future arms races between other nations cannot be ruled out and these could lead to even greater arsenals than those present at the height of the Cold War. The world’s supply of plutonium has been increasing steadily to about two thousand tons, some ten times as much as remains tied up in warheads ([9], p. 26). (iv) Even if some humans survive the short-term effects of a nuclear war, it could lead to the collapse of civilization. A human race living under stone-age conditions may or may not be more resilient to extinction than other animal species. 4.3 **We’re living in a simulation and it gets shut down** A case can be made that the hypothesis that we are living in a computer simulation should be given a significant probability [27]. The basic idea behind this so-called “Simulation argument” is that vast amounts of computing power may become available in the future (see e.g. [28,29]), and that it could be used, among other things, to run large numbers of fine-grained simulations of past human civilizations. Under some not-too-implausible assumptions, the result can be that almost all minds like ours are simulated minds, and that we should therefore assign a significant probability to being such computer-emulated minds rather than the (subjectively indistinguishable) minds of originally evolved creatures. And if we are, we suffer the risk that the simulation may be shut down at any time. A decision to terminate our simulation may be **prompted by our actions** or by exogenous factors. While to some it may seem frivolous to list such a radical or “philosophical” hypothesis next the concrete threat of nuclear holocaust, we must seek to base these evaluations on reasons rather than untutored intuition. Until a refutation appears of the argument presented in [27], it would intellectually dishonest to neglect to mention simulation-shutdown as a potential extinction mode. 4.4 **Badly programmed superintelligence** When we create the first superintelligent entity [28-34], we might make a mistake and give it goals that lead it to annihilate humankind, assuming its enormous intellectual advantage gives it the power to do so. For example, we could mistakenly elevate a subgoal to the status of a supergoal. We tell it to solve a mathematical problem, and it complies by turning all the matter in the solar system into a giant calculating device, in the process killing the person who asked the question. (For further analysis of this, see [35].) 4.5 **Genetically engineered biological agent** With the fabulous advances in genetic technology currently taking place, it may become possible for a tyrant, terrorist, or lunatic to create a doomsday virus, an organism that **combines long latency with high virulence and mortality** [36]. Dangerous viruses can even be spawned unintentionally, as Australian researchers recently demonstrated when they created a modified mousepox virus with 100% mortality while trying to design a contraceptive virus for mice for use in pest control [37]. While this particular virus doesn’t affect humans, it is suspected that an analogous alteration would increase the mortality of the human smallpox virus. What underscores the future hazard here is that the research was quickly published in the open scientific literature [38]. It is hard to see how information generated in open biotech research programs could be contained no matter how grave the potential danger that it poses; and the same holds for research in nanotechnology. Genetic medicine will also lead to better cures and vaccines, but there is no guarantee that defense will always keep pace with offense. (Even the accidentally created mousepox virus had a 50% mortality rate on vaccinated mice.) Eventually, worry about biological weapons may be put to rest through the development of nanomedicine, but while nanotechnology has enormous long-term potential for medicine [39] it carries its own hazards. 4.6 **Accidental misuse of nanotechnology** (“gray goo”) The possibility of accidents can never be completely ruled out. However, there are many ways of making sure, through responsible engineering practices, that species-destroying accidents do not occur. One could avoid using self-replication; one could make nanobots dependent on some rare feedstock chemical that doesn’t exist in the wild; one could confine them to sealed environments; one could design them in such a way that any mutation was overwhelmingly likely to cause a nanobot to completely cease to function [40]. Accidental misuse is therefore a smaller concern than malicious misuse [23,25,41]. However, the distinction between the accidental and the deliberate can become blurred. While “in principle” it seems possible to make terminal nanotechnological accidents extremely improbable, the actual circumstances may not permit this ideal level of security to be realized. Compare nanotechnology with nuclear technology. From an engineering perspective, it is of course perfectly possible to use nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes such as nuclear reactors, which have a zero chance of destroying the whole planet. Yet in practice it may be very hard to avoid nuclear technology also being used to build nuclear weapons, leading to an arms race. With large nuclear arsenals on hair-trigger alert, there is inevitably a significant risk of accidental war. The same can happen with nanotechnology: it may be pressed into serving military objectives in a way that carries unavoidable risks of serious accidents. In some situations it can even be strategically advantageous to deliberately make one’s technology or control systems risky, for example in order to make a “threat that leaves something to chance” [42]. 4.7 **Something unforeseen** We need a catch-all category. It would be foolish to be confident that we have already imagined and anticipated all significant risks. Future technological or scientific developments may very well reveal novel ways of destroying the world. Some foreseen hazards (hence not members of the current category) which have been excluded from the list of bangs on grounds that they seem too unlikely to cause a global terminal disaster are: solar flares, supernovae, black hole explosions or mergers, gamma-ray bursts, galactic center outbursts, supervolcanos, loss of biodiversity, buildup of air pollution, gradual loss of human fertility, and various religious doomsday scenarios. The hypothesis that we will one day become “illuminated” and commit collective suicide or stop reproducing, as supporters of VHEMT (The Voluntary Human Extinction Movement) hope [43], appears unlikely. If it really were better not to exist (as Silenus told king Midas in the Greek myth, and as Arthur Schopenhauer argued [44] although for reasons specific to his philosophical system he didn’t advocate suicide), then we should not count this scenario as an existential disaster. The assumption that it is not worse to be alive should be regarded as an implicit assumption in the definition of Bangs. Erroneous collective suicide is an existential risk albeit one whose probability seems extremely slight. (For more on the ethics of human extinction, see chapter 4 of [9].) 4.8 **Physics disasters** The Manhattan Project bomb-builders’ concern about an A-bomb-derived atmospheric conflagration has contemporary analogues. There have been speculations that future high-energy particle accelerator experiments may cause a breakdown of a metastable vacuum state that our part of the cosmos might be in, converting it into a “true” vacuum of lower energy density [45]. This would result in an expanding bubble of total destruction that would sweep through the galaxy and beyond at the speed of light, tearing all matter apart as it proceeds. Another conceivability is that accelerator experiments might produce negatively charged stable “strangelets” (a hypothetical form of nuclear matter) or create a mini black hole that would sink to the center of the Earth and start accreting the rest of the planet [46]. These outcomes seem to be impossible given our best current physical theories. But the reason we do the experiments is precisely that we don’t really know what will happen. A more reassuring argument is that the energy densities attained in present day accelerators are far lower than those that occur naturally in collisions between cosmic rays [46,47]. It’s possible, however, that factors other than energy density are relevant for these hypothetical processes, and that those factors will be brought together in novel ways in future experiments. The main reason for concern in the “physics disasters” category is the meta-level observation that discoveries of all sorts of weird physical phenomena are made all the time, so even if right now all the particular physics disasters we have conceived of were absurdly improbable or impossible, there could be other more realistic failure-modes waiting to be uncovered. The ones listed here are merely illustrations of the general case.

#### They’ve got it backwards - liberalism makes authoritarianism inevitable

**Robinson 20**- distinguished professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara. (William, <https://truthout.org/articles/to-defeat-fascism-we-must-recognize-its-a-failed-response-to-capitalist-crisis/>, emuse)

In the broader picture, **fascism**, whether in its 20th- or 21st-century variant, **is a particular, far right response to capitalist crisis**, such as that of the 1930s and the one that began with the financial meltdown of 2008 and has now been greatly intensified by the pandemic. Trumpism in the United States; Brexit in the United Kingdom; the increasing influence of neo-fascist and authoritarian parties and movements throughout Europe (including Poland, Germany, Hungary, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Belgium and Greece), and around the world (such as in Israel, Turkey, the Philippines, Brazil and India), represent just such a far-right response to the crisis. Trumpism and Fascism **The telltale signs of the fascist threat in the United States are in plain sight.** Fascist movements expanded rapidly since the turn of the century in civil society and in the political system through the right wing of the Republican Party. Trump proved to be a charismatic figure able to galvanize and embolden disparate neo-fascist forces, from white supremacists, white nationalists, militia, neo-Nazis and Klansmen, to the Oath Keepers, the Patriot Movement, Christian fundamentalists, and anti-immigrant vigilante groups. Since 2016, numerous other groups have emerged, from the Proud Boys and QAnon to the Boogaloo movement (whose explicit goal is to spark a civil war) and the terrorist Michigan group known as Wolverine Watchmen. They are heavily armed and mobilizing for confrontation in near-perfect consort with the extreme right wing of the Republican Party, which long since has captured that party and turned it into one of utter reaction. Encouraged by Trump’s imperial bravado, his populist and nationalist rhetoric, and his openly racist discourse, predicated in part on whipping up anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and anti-Black sentiment, they began to cross-pollinate to a degree not seen in decades as they gained a toehold in the Trump White House and in state and local governments around the country. Paramilitarism spread within many of these organizations and overlapped with state repressive agencies. Racist, far right and fascist militia, identified by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security as the most lethal domestic terrorist threat, [operate inside law enforcement agencies](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-plain-sight-racism-white-supremacy-and-far-right-militancy-law). As far back as 2006, a [government intelligence assessment](http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/402521/doc-26-white-supremacist-infiltration.pdf) had warned of “white supremacist infiltration of law enforcement by organized groups and by self-initiated infiltration by law enforcement personnel sympathetic to white supremacist causes.” The fascist insurgency reached a feverish pitch in the wake of the mass protests sparked by the police-perpetrated murder of George Floyd in May. Among recent incidents too numerous to list, fascist militia members have routinely showed up heavily armed at anti-racist rallies to threaten protesters, and in several instances, have carried out assassinations. Trump has refused to condemn the armed right-wing insurgency. To the contrary, he [defended a self-described vigilante and “Blue Lives Matter” enthusiast](https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/08/31/908137377/trump-defends-kenosha-shooting-suspect) who shot to death two unarmed protesters in Kenosha, Wisconsin, on August 25. On September 3, federal marshals carried out an extra-judicial execution of [Michael Reinoehl](https://truthout.org/articles/trump-appears-to-admit-extrajudicial-killing-of-michael-reinoehl-was-planned/), who admitted to shooting a few days earlier a member of the white supremacist group Patriot Prayer during a confrontation between Trump supporters and counterprotesters in Portland, Oregon. “There has to be [retribution](https://www.vox.com/2020/9/14/21436216/trump-michael-reinoehl-protests-portland-shooting),” declared Trump in a chilling interview in which he seemed to take credit for what amounted to a death squad execution. Particularly ominous was the plot by a domestic terrorist militia group, broken up on October 8, to storm the Michigan state capitol to kidnap and possibly kill the Democratic governor of Michigan and other officials, a conspiracy that the White House refused to condemn. While there are great differences between [20th- and 21st-century fascism](http://robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb.edu/Assets/pdf/FascismbeyondTrump.pdf) and any parallels should not be exaggerated, we would do well to recall the 1923 [“beer hall putsch”](https://www.britannica.com/event/Beer-Hall-Putsch/The-Munich-Putsch) in Bavaria, Germany, which marked a turning point in the Nazis’ rise to power. In that incident, Hitler and a heavily armed group of his followers hatched a plot to kidnap leaders of the Bavarian government. Loyal government officials put down the putsch and jailed Hitler but the fascist insurgency expanded in its aftermath. The fascist putsch now hinges on the November election. The rule of law is breaking down. Trump has claimed, without any credible evidence, that the vote will be fraudulent, has refused to commit to a peaceful transfer of power should he lose, and has all but called on his supporters to be prepared for an insurrection. Himself a [transnational capitalist](http://robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb.edu/Assets/pdf/TheTransnationalCapitalistClass.pdf), a racist and a fascist, Trump took advantage of the protests over the murder of George Floyd to bring the project to a new level, inciting from the White House itself the fascist mobilization in U.S. civil society, manipulating fear and a racist backlash with his “law and order” discourse, and threatening a qualitative escalation of the police state. Widespread and systematic voter suppression, especially of those from marginalized communities, has already [disenfranchised](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/07/americans-voting-rights-disenfranchisement) millions. Donald Trump Jr. [called in September for](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election/donald-trump-jr-video-2020-election-ballot-fraud-b605186.html) “every able-bodied man and woman to join an army for Trump’s election security operation.” Morphology of the Fascist Project The current crisis of global capitalism is both structural and political. Politically, **capitalist states face spiraling crises of legitimacy after decades of hardship and social decay** wrought by neoliberalism, **aggravated** now **by these states’ inability to manage** the health emergency and the **economic collapse.** The level of global social polarization and [inequality is unprecedented](https://oi-files-d8-prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/file_attachments/ib-wealth-having-all-wanting-more-190115-en.pdf). The richest 1 percent of humanity control more than half of the world’s wealth while the bottom 80 percent had to make do with just 5 percent of this wealth. Such extreme inequalities can only be sustained by extreme levels of state and private violence that lend themselves to fascist political projects. Structurally, the global economy is mired in a crisis of overaccumulation, or chronic stagnation, made much worse by the pandemic. As inequalities escalate, the system churns out more and more wealth that the mass of working people cannot actually consume. As a result, the global market cannot absorb the output of the global economy. The transnational capitalist class cannot find outlets to “unload” the trillions of dollars it has accumulated. In recent years, it has turned to mind-boggling levels of financial speculation, to the raiding and sacking of public budgets, and to militarized accumulation or accumulation by repression. This refers to how accumulation of capital comes increasingly to rely on transnational systems of social control, repression and warfare, as [the global police state](https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745341644/the-global-police-state/) expands to defend the global war economy from rebellions from below. **Fascism seeks to rescue capitalism from this organic crisis**; that is, to violently restore capital accumulation, establish new forms of state legitimacy and suppress threats from below unencumbered by democratic constraints. The project involves a fusion of repressive and reactionary state power with a fascist mobilization in civil society. Twenty-first-century fascism, like its 20th-century predecessor, is a violently toxic mix of reactionary nationalism and racism. Its discursive and ideological repertoire involves extreme nationalism and the promise of national regeneration, xenophobia, doctrines of race/culture supremacy alongside a violent racist mobilization, **martial masculinity, militarization of civic and political life, and the normalization — even glorification — of war**, social violence and domination. As with its 20th-century predecessor, **the 21st-century fascist project hinges on the psychosocial mechanism of dispersing mass fear and anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis toward scapegoated communities**, whether Jews in Nazi Germany, immigrants in the United States, or Muslims and lower castes in India, and also on to an external enemy, such as communism during the Cold War, or China and Russia currently. It seeks to organize a mass social base with the promise to restore stability and security to those destabilized by capitalist crises. Fascist organizers appeal to the same social base of those millions who have been devastate

d by neoliberal austerity, impoverishment, precarious employment and relegation to the ranks of surplus labor, all greatly aggravated by the pandemic. As popular discontent has spread, far right and neo-fascist mobilization play a critical role in the effort by dominant groups to channel this discontent away from a critique of global capitalism and toward support for the transnational capitalist class agenda dressed in populist rhetoric. The fascist appeal is directed in particular to historically privileged sectors of the global working class, such as white workers in the Global North and urban middle layers in the Global South, that are experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility and socioeconomic destabilization. The flip side of targeting certain disaffected sectors is the violent control and suppression of other sectors — which, in the United States, come disproportionately from the ranks of surplus labor, communities that face racial and ethnic oppression, or religious and other forms of persecution. The mechanisms of coercive exclusion include mass incarceration and the spread of prison-industrial complexes; anti-immigrant legislation and deportation regimes; the manipulation of space in new ways so that both gated communities and ghettos are controlled by armies of private security guards and technologically advanced surveillance systems; ubiquitous, often paramilitarized policing; “non-lethal” crowd control methods; and mobilization of the culture industries and state ideological apparatuses to dehumanize victims of global capitalism as dangerous, depraved and culturally degenerate. Racism and Competing Interpretations of the Crisis We cannot under-emphasize the role of racism for the fascist mobilization in the United States. But we need to deepen our analysis of it. The U.S. political system and the dominant groups face a crisis of hegemony and legitimacy. This has involved the breakdown of the white racist historic bloc that to one extent or another reigned supreme from the end of post-Civil War reconstruction to the late 20th century but has become destabilized through capitalist globalization. The far right and neo-fascists are attempting to reconstruct such a bloc, in which “national” identity becomes “white identity” as a stand-in (that is, a code) for a racist mobilization against perceived sources of anxiety and insecurity. Yet many white members of the working class have been experiencing social and economic destabilization, downward mobility, heightened insecurity, an uncertain future and accelerated precariatization — that is, ever more precarious work and life conditions. This sector has historically enjoyed the ethnic-racial privileges that come from white supremacy vis-à-vis other sectors of the working class, but it has been losing these privileges in the face of capitalist globalization. The escalation of veiled and also openly racist discourse from above is aimed at ushering the members of this white working-class sector into a racist and a neo-fascist understanding of their condition. Racism and the appeal to fascism offer workers from the dominant racial or ethnic group an imaginary solution to real contradictions; recognition of the existence of suffering and oppression, even though its solution is a false one. The parties and movements associated with such projects have put forth a racist discourse, less coded and less mediated than that of mainstream politicians, targeting the racially oppressed, ethnic or religious minorities, immigrants and refugees in particular as scapegoats. Yet in this age of globalized capitalism, there is little possibility in the United States or elsewhere of providing such benefits, so that the “wages of fascism” now appear to be entirely psychological. The ideology of 21st-century fascism rests on irrationality — a promise to deliver security and restore stability that is emotive, not rational. It is a project that does not and need not distinguish between the truth and the lie. The Trump regime’s public discourse of populism and nationalism, for example, bears no relation to its actual policies. Trumponomics involves a sweeping deregulation of capital, slashing social spending, dismantling what remains of the welfare state, privatization, tax breaks to corporations and the rich, anti-worker laws, and an expansion of state subsidies to capital — in short, radical neoliberalism. Trump’s populism has no policy substance. It is almost entirely symbolic — hence the significance of his fanatical “build the wall” and similar rhetoric, symbolically essential to sustain a social base for which the state can provide little or no material bribe. This also helps to explain the increasing desperation in Trump’s bravado as the election approaches. But here is the clincher: Deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and rising insecurity do not automatically lead to racist or fascist backlash. A racist/fascist interpretation of these conditions must be mediated by political agents and state agencies. Trumpism represents just such a mediation. **To beat back the threat of fascism, popular resistance forces must put forward an alternative interpretation of the crisis, involving a social justice agenda founded on a working-class politics that can win over the would-be social base** of fascism. This would-be base is made up of a majority of workers who are experiencing the same deleterious effects of global capitalism in crisis as the entire working class. We need a social justice and working-class agenda to respond to its increasingly immiserated condition, lest we leave it susceptible to a far right populist manipulation of this condition. Joe Biden may well win the election. Yet even if he does so and manages to take office, the crisis of global capitalism and the fascist project it is stoking will continue. **A united front against fascism must be based on a social justice agenda that targets capitalism and its crisis.**

# 1AR

## Adv

### 1AR---AT: Lashout

#### Lashout is small and don’t escalate

Dominic **Tierney 17**, associate professor of political science at Swarthmore College and contributing editor at The Atlantic, latest book is The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts, “The Risks of Foreign Policy as Political Distraction,” The Atlantic, 6/15/2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/trump-diversionary-foreign-policy/530079/

But what about military force? To be clear, there is little cause to speculate that Trump plans to launch a full-scale war solely to distract attention. For one thing, as president, the worst possible time to start a major military campaign is when you’re deeply unpopular. And the political upside is shaky at best. Recent big wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were politically damaging to George W. Bush. Even victory doesn’t guarantee a pay-off, as George H. W. Bush discovered when he won the 1991 Gulf War and then lost his bid for reelection in 1992. A crisis may arise where there are real national-security rationales for fighting, along with potential domestic gains. Here, the payoff at home would likely enter Trump’s calculus, and even push him over the edge to fight, with the legitimate casus belli providing a shield of plausible deniability. The most tempting use of force may be a seemingly manageable, but still dazzling, kinetic operation, like a missile strike or a raid to kill terrorist leaders. Another option would be to escalate a crisis where an easy win seems available: The key is to find the right enemy, one that’s both widely hated and too weak to fight back. After all, there’s a well-established “rally ‘round the flag” effect, where almost any military crisis temporarily juices the president’s approval ratings. In the wake of Clinton’s airstrikes in 1998, one poll found that 68 percent of Americans approved of his foreign policy. Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich said, “it was the right thing to do at the right time.”

## CP---Antitrust PIC

### 1AR---AT: NB

#### Means they don’t solve

Elhauge ’17 [Einer; December 6; Law Professor at Harvard University; United States Antitrust Law and Economics, “Introduction: An Overview of Antitrust Laws and Remedial Structure,” p. 42-43]

b. EXPLICIT EXEMPTIONS OR LIMITATIONS. Congress has also frequently enacted explicit exemptions or alterations of antitrust standards. These include exemptions that:

1. Allow those who farm or fish to form cooperatives without those cooperatives being considered agreements in restraint of trade, although the Secretary of Agriculture has authority to enjoin cooperatives that unduly enhance prices. This exemption does not extend to agreements with nonexempt persons, nor to exclusionary conduct by cooperatives against rivals or other nonmembers.

2. Exempt certain mergers and television agreements by sports leagues. Baseball also enjoys a special judicially- created antitrust exemption, other than for conduct that affects the employment of ballplayers, which is instead governed by the labor exemption described below.

3. Immunize charitable gift annuities or charitable remainder trusts.

4. Exempt the medical resident matching program.

5. Provide more generous antitrust standards for mergers and agreements between newspapers when one is a failing firm.183

6. Exempt professional review bodies from antitrust damages for actions that are based on the quality of a physician's care and may adversely affect the physician's hospital privileges or society memberships, provided the actions were based on a reasonable belief that they would enhance the quality of health care and were made after reasonable investigation and process.

7. Exempt collective rate making that is known and approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission.185

8. Exempt shipper conduct that is already prohibited by the Shipping Act of 1984. «

9. Exempt agreements that the President finds vital to national defense.

10. Exempt joint research and development that has been approved by the Small Business Administration.

11. Provide more generous antitrust standards for judging bank mergers.

All of these exemptions require examination of the detailed statutory requirements. Two other exemptions require a bit more discussion because of their importance and doctrinal development.

## DA---FTC

### 1AR---DA---FTC

#### 1---State control bad---indigenous leadership solves better than US leadership

#### That ensures evil AI

Salvador **Pueyo 18**. 8 Department of Evolutionary Biology, Ecology, and Environmental Sciences, Universitat de Barcelona. 10/01/2018. “Growth, Degrowth, and the Challenge of Artificial Superintelligence.” Journal of Cleaner Production, vol. 197, pp. 1731–1736.

The challenges of sustainability and of superintelligence are not independent. The changing 84 fluxes of energy, matter, and information can be interpreted as different faces of a general acceleration2 85 . More directly, it is argued below that superintelligence would deeply affect 86 production technologies and also economic decisions, and could in turn be affected by the 87 socioeconomic and ecological context in which it develops. Along the lines of Pueyo (2014, p. 88 3454), this paper presents an approach that integrates these topics. It employs insights from a 89 variety of sources, such as ecological theory and several schools of economic theory. 90 The next section presents a thought experiment, in which superintelligence emerges after the 91 technical aspects of goal alignment have been resolved, and this occurs specifically in a neoliberal 92 scenario. Neoliberalism is a major force shaping current policies on a global level, which urges 93 governments to assume as their main role the creation and support of capitalist markets, and to 94 avoid interfering in their functioning (Mirowski, 2009). Neoliberal policies stand in sharp contrast 95 to degrowth views: the first are largely rationalized as a way to enhance efficiency and production 96 (Plehwe, 2009), and represent the maximum expression of capitalist values. 97 The thought experiment illustrates how superintelligence perfectly aligned with capitalist 98 markets could have very undesirable consequences for humanity and the whole biosphere. It also 99 suggests that there is little reason to expect that the wealthiest and most powerful people would be 100 exempt from these consequences, which, as argued below, gives reason for hope. Section 3 raises 101 the possibility of a broad social consensus to respond to this challenge along the lines of degrowth, 102 thus tackling major technological, environmental, and social problems simultaneously. The 103 uncertainty involved in these scenarios is vast, but, if a non-negligible probability is assigned to 104 these two futures, little room is left for either complacency or resignation. 105 106 2. Thought experiment: Superintelligence in a neoliberal scenario 107 108 Neoliberalism is creating a very special breeding ground for superintelligence, because it strives 109 to reduce the role of human agency in collective affairs. The neoliberal pioneer Friedrich Hayek 110 argued that the spontaneous order of markets was preferable over conscious plans, because markets, 111 he thought, have more capacity than humans to process information (Mirowski, 2009). Neoliberal 112 policies are actively transferring decisions to markets (Mirowski, 2009), while firms' automated 113 decision systems become an integral part of the market's information processing machinery 114 (Davenport and Harris, 2005). Neoliberal globalization is locking governments in the role of mere 115 players competing in the global market (Swank, 2016). Furthermore, automated governance is a 116 foundational tenet of neoliberal ideology (Plehwe, 2009, p. 23). 117 In the neoliberal scenario, most technological development can be expected to take place either in the context of firms or in support of firms3 118 . A number of institutionalist (Galbraith, 1985), post119 Keynesian (Lavoie, 2014; and references therein) and evolutionary (Metcalfe, 2008) economists 120 concur that, in capitalist markets, firms tend to maximize their growth rates (this principle is related 121 but not identical to the neoclassical assumption that firms maximize profits; Lavoie, 2014). Growth 122 maximization might be interpreted as expressing the goals of people in key positions, but, from an 123 evolutionary perspective, it is thought to result from a mechanism akin to natural selection 124 (Metcalfe, 2008). The first interpretation is insufficient if we accept that: (1) in big corporations, the 125 managerial bureaucracy is a coherent social-psychological system with motives and preferences of 126 its own (Gordon, 1968, p. 639; for an insider view, see Nace, 2005, pp. 1-10), (2) this system is 127 becoming techno-social-psychological with the progressive incorporation of decision-making 128 algorithms and the increasing opacity of such algorithms (Danaher, 2016), and (3) human mentality 129 and goals are partly shaped by firms themselves (Galbraith, 1985). 130 The type of AI best suited to participate in firms' decisions in this context is described in a 131 recent review in Science: AI researchers aim to construct a synthetic homo economicus, the 132 mythical perfectly rational agent of neoclassical economics. We review progress toward creating 133 this new species of machine, machina economicus (Parkes and Wellman, 2015, p. 267; a more 134 orthodox denomination would be Machina oeconomica). 135 Firm growth is thought to rely critically on retained earnings (Galbraith, 1985; Lavoie, 2014, p. 136 134-141). Therefore, economic selection can be generally expected to favor firms in which these are greater. The aggregate retained earnings4 137 RE of all firms in an economy can be expressed as: 138 RE=FE(R,L,K)-w⋅L-(i+δ)⋅K-g. (1) 139 Bold symbols represent vectors (to indicate multidimensionality). F is an aggregate production 140 function, relying on inputs of various types of natural resources R, labor L and capital K (including intelligent machines), and being affected by environmental factors5 141 E; w are wages, i are returns to 142 capital (dividends, interests) paid to households, δ is depreciation and g are the net taxes paid to 143 governments. 144 Increases in retained earnings face constraints, such as trade-offs among different parameters of 145 Eq. 1. The present thought experiment explores the consequences of economic selection in a 146 scenario in which two sets of constraints are nearly absent: sociopolitical constraints on market 147 dynamics are averted by a neoliberal institutional setting, while technical constraints are overcome 148 by asymptotically advanced technology (with extreme AI allowing for extreme technological 149 development also in other fields). The environmental and the social implications are discussed in 150 turn. Note that this scenario is not defined by some contingent choice of AIs' goals by their 151 programmers: The goals of maximizing each firm's growth and retained earnings are assumed to 152 emerge from the collective dynamics of large sets of entities subject to capitalistic rules of 153 interaction and, therefore, to economic selection.

#### FTC is structurally incapable of being an effective regulator

Lande and Davis ‘17 [Robert; Joshua; 2017; Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, and a Director of the American Antitrust Institute; Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship, Professor of Law, and Director, Center for Law and Ethics, University of San Francisco School of Law, and member of the Advisory Board of the American Antitrust Institute; A Report to the 45th President of the United States; “Restoring the Legitimacy of Private Enforcement,” ch. 6]

As has been observed, “government cannot be expected to do all or even most of the necessary enforcement” for numerous reasons – in addition to budgetary constraints – including “undue fear of losing cases; lack of awareness of industry conditions; overly suspicious views about complaints by ‘losers’ that they were in fact victims of anticompetitive behavior; higher turnover among government attorneys; and the unfortunate, but undeniable, reality that government enforcement (or nonenforcement) decisions are, at times, politically motivated.”7

#### 3---No China/Russia follow on

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1. China’s leadership – including President Xi Jinping – believes that being at the forefront in AI technology is critical to the future of global military and economic power competition. In July 2017, China’s State Council issued the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP).1 This document – along with Made in China 2025,2 released in May 2015 – form the core of China’s AI strategy. Both documents, as well as the issue of AI more generally, have received significant and sustained attention from the highest levels of China’s leadership, including Xi Jinping. Total Chinese national and local government spending on AI to implement these plans is not publicly disclosed, but it is clearly in the tens of billions of dollars. At least two3 Chinese regional governments have each committed to investing 100 billion yuan (~$14.7 billion USD).4 The opening paragraphs of the AIDP exemplify mainstream Chinese views regarding AI: AI has become a new focus of international competition. AI is a strategic technology that will lead in the future; the world’s major developed countries are taking the development of AI as a major strategy to enhance national competitiveness and protect national security.5 The above quote also reflects how China’s AI policy community6 is paying close attention to the AI industries and policies of other countries, particularly the United States. Chinese government organizations routinely translate, disseminate, and analyze U.S. government and think tank reports about AI. In my conversations with Chinese officials and my reading of Chinese government AI reports, they demonstrated substantive and timely knowledge of AI developments in the United States and elsewhere. Chinese government AI reports frequently cite U.S. national security think tank publications.7 The U.S. policymaking community ought to make it a priority to be equally effective at translating, analyzing, and disseminating Chinese publications on AI for the insights they provide into Chinese thinking.8 2. China’s leadership – including Xi Jinping – believes that China should pursue global leadership in AI technology and reduce its vulnerable dependence on imports of international technology. In October 2018, Xi Jinping led a Politburo study session on AI. Such sessions are reserved for the high-priority policy issues where leaders need the benefit of outside expertise. Xi’s publicly reported comments during and after the study session reiterated the main conclusions of both the AIDP and Made in China 2025, which were that China should “achieve world-leading levels”9 in AI technology and reduce its vulnerable “external [foreign] dependence for key technologies and advanced equipment.”10 In his speech during the study session, Xi said that China must “ensure that our country marches in the front ranks where it comes to theoretical research in this important area of AI, and occupies the high ground in critical and AI core technologies.”11 Xi further said that China must “pay firm attention to the structure of our shortcomings, ensure that critical and core AI technologies are firmly grasped in our own hands.” Xi’s speech demonstrates that China’s leadership continues to subscribe to AIDP’s and Made in China 2025’s two major conclusions that China should pursue both world leadership and self-reliance in AI technology. The Chinese AI sector’s dependence on foreign technology is discussed further in point nine.

## K---Cap

### 1AR---AT: AT PIC

#### Means no labor organizing

Elhauge ’17 [Einer; December 6; Law Professor at Harvard University; United States Antitrust Law and Economics, “Introduction: An Overview of Antitrust Laws and Remedial Structure,” p. 46-49]

d. THE LABOR EXEMPTIONS. Without a labor exemption, ordinary union activities like strikes or setting labor prices in collective bargaining agreements would be horizontal boycotts and price-fixing agreements subject to the risk of antitrust liability. To avoid this, Congress has enacted statutes that provide antitrust exemptions for, and bar injunctions against, such ordinary labor union activities as collective refusals to supply labor or agreements not to compete on wages or other employment terms. This explicit statutory exemption protects agreements among labor employees, but not among independent contractors who collectively engage in boycotts or price-fixing. The explicit statutory exemption extends only to conduct and agreements by employees and their unions, and not to their agreements with non-labor groups.

### 1AR---AT: Links

#### Limited antitrust scope entrenches the control of capital---the plan radically departs from historical antitrust policies in favor of the abolition of capitalism

Fuchs '12 [Christian; 7/1/12; professor and chair in media and communication studies at Uppsala University's Department of Informatics and Media; "With or Without Marx? With or Without Capitalism? A Rejoinder to Adam Arvidsson and Eleanor Colleoni," https://doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v10i2.434/]

Do Arvidsson and Colleoni suggest alternatives? Do they have a vision of a life beyond capitalism? Open access, data portability, antitrust policies against capital concentration, building alternative platforms are mentioned in their article. They imagine “more ’democratic’“ social media (Arvidsson and Colleoni 2012, 147), do not question capitalism as such, but rather suggest a stronger regulation of the corporate Internet shall according to this conception exist in parallel with some alternative Internet platforms. The answer to the question asked in the title of this contribution is that to choose to be without Marx means to be in favour of capitalism and to support ideology, as Adam Arvidsson and Eleanor Colleoni’s approach shows very clearly. They advance an approach that is not only directed against Marx, but as a consequence also supportive of capitalism.

Arvidsson (2010) argues for building a peer-review system that is used for the evaluation of products by consumers and producers as an important element of an “ethical economy”. Social media, mobile phones and RFID could help to bring about a global and universal quantitative rating system for the economy (Arvidsson 2009). Arvidsson (2008) says that in such a system, the power of consumers and workers would increase, that companies as a result would mainly make money in the financial markets, and that capitalism would “become ethical in new and radical ways“ (Arvidsson 2008, 336). This would mean a “reform of capitalism“, the emergence of blended values and of a “global New Deal organised around sustainability and social responsibility“ (Arvidsson 2009, 27).

Arvidsson and Colleoni (2012, 147) say that their approach is “very un-Marxist in its conclusions”. Its political implications show indeed that the motivation for the authors’ criticism of Marxist theory is that they want to improve and not abolish capitalism. They imagine a more just, sustainable, and responsible capitalism. This terminology not only fits perfectly into contemporary neoliberal ideology, but is also naïve and idealistic: It ignores that all forms of capitalism are based on inequality and are crisis-prone. And crisis always means misery, precariousness, and more inequality. Capitalism is never responsible, sustainable, or ethical. The suggestion to entrepreneurs that they should support the ethical economy concept because such a transformed economy would enable them to make profits in the financial markets is furthermore arguing for an advancement of financialization and thereby ignores the high crisis-proneness of financial capitalism that has been proofed once more recently in the new world economic crisis. Arvidsson imagines that capitalism and a non-capitalistic economy can friendly co-exist in the form of an ethical capitalism. He thereby ignores the imperialistic and colonialist character of capitalism: imperialism creates milieus of accumulation, i.e. it commodifies spheres of non-capitalist existence in processes that David Harvey (2003) has termed accumulation by dispossession in order to guarantee its further existence. Capitalism is an inherently violent and expansive system that, as history has shown, does not accept any friendly co-existence with non-capitalist systems, but aims at their destruction. The contemporary crisis of capitalism and the existence of global inequality and precariousness have shown that we need alternatives to capitalism in order to create a humane society. My conclusion and approach is therefore in contrast to Arvidsson Marxist in character: it aims at the struggle for a humane, non-capitalist world. In terms of the Internet this means the ethical need of struggles for a non-capitalist Internet and the advancement of non-capitalist Internet platforms that contradict and struggle against the capitalist Internet and aim at the establishment of a communist Internet.